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Abstract
How can agricultural inheritance traditions affect structural change and economic development in rural
areas? The most prominent historical traditions are primogeniture, where the oldest son inherits the whole
farm, and equal partition, where land is split and each heir inherits an equal share. In this paper, we provide
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spatial RDD estimates for Baden-Wu¨rttemberg in the 1950s and today. We ﬁnd that inheritance rules
caused, in line with our theoretical predictions, higher incomes, population densities, and industrialization
levels in areas with equal partition. Results suggest that more than a third of the overall inter-regional
difference in average per capita income in present-day Baden Wu¨rttemberg, or 597 Euro, can be explained
by equal partition.
JEL Codes: D02 · D82 · H11 · H21 · N93
Keywords: Inheritance rules · sectoral change · regional economic development · Baden-Wu¨rttemberg ·
spatial inequalities
*We would like to thank Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer, Nikolaus Wolf, Eric Chaney, Giacomo De Luca, Alexander
Donges, Steven Pfaff, Ulrich Pﬁster, Andrew Pickering, Yannay Spitzer, Jochen Streb, Max Winkler, Nathan Nunn, Se-
bastian Braun and Sascha Becker. We also thank seminar participants in York, Hohenheim and Go¨ttingen as well as the
participants of the III. Congress on Economic and Social History 2019 in Regensburg and the 18th Annual ASREC Con-
ference 2019 in Boston, especially Jared Rubin and Mark Koyama, the 2nd Workshop on Geodata in Economics 2019 in
Hamburg especially Stefano Falcone, Maxim Pinkovskiy and David Weil, and the 23rd SIOE Conference 2019 in Stock-
holm.
†Thilo R. Huning is lecturer at Department for Economics and Related Studies, University of York, Hesligton, York
YO10 5DD, UK; e-mail: thilo.huning at york.ac.uk
‡Fabian Wahl is post doctoral researcher at the Institute for Economic and Social History with Agricultural History,
University of Hohenheim, Wollgrasweg 49, 70599 Stuttgart, Germany; e-mail: fabian.wahl at uni-hohenheim.de
1
EQUAL PARTITION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
THIS PAPER MAKES FOUR NOVEL CONTRIBUTIONS to the literature on the inﬂuence of informal
institutions on economic development. First, we argue that particular types of social norms, agri-
cultural inheritance traditions, like primogeniture and equal partition, have a profound and per-
sistent effect on economic development. We show, based on historical and theoretical arguments,
that equal partition is more favorable for regional industrialization and development.
Second, we derive a neoclassical model in which we allow a Malthusian economy to feature these
different inheritance traditions, and in a second step to be capitalized from outside. This mod-
els the historic experience of the rural areas. The putting-out system gave employment to the
rural population, which in turn was more willing to take this employment in areas of equal parti-
tion.
As third contribution, our results imply that equal partition is an institution that reduces spatial
labor mobility but, counter-intuitively, aids economic development. This is an interesting addition
to the literature around the ‘Oswald hypothesis’ (Oswald 1996).
Fourth, to our knowledge, this research is one of the ﬁrst attempts to investigate systematically the
long-run development of rural areas. This is crucial for the understanding of regional economic
development, as historically most of the population lived in rural areas or small towns and not in
large cities. Yet, cities have received most of the attention of research so far (Bosker, Buringh, and
Van Zanden 2013; Bosker and Buringh 2017; Bo¨rner and Severgnini 2014; Dittmar and Meisenzahl
2017; Jacob 2010).
Agricultural inheritance traditions have raised ample speculations about their consequences, em-
pirical studies however are rare. Ekelund, He´bert, and Tollison (2002) conduct a descriptive cross-
country analysis and argue that Protestantism could spread easier into the equal partition area be-
cause of their more ﬂexible, heterogeneous and unstable societies. More recently Rink and Hilbig
(2018), also using data from Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, study the link between inheritance traditions,
economic inequality and pro-egalitarian preferences.1
Historians such as Wehler (2008) view the German industrialization as a rural, and not an urban,
phenomenon. He argues that the industrialization of Germany avoided cities’ regulated labor
markets by capitalizing the countryside using the putting-out system. We conﬁrm this historical
literature by showing theoretically that the putting-out system was likely to be more developed in
areas of equal partition. Only there, because of smaller farm sizes, more farmers engaged in part-
time farming and needed non-agricultural sources of income to survive. Our aim is to re-introduce
this perspective into the old debate about the origins, causes, and spread of the industrialization
of European countries. As such, we view the geographic pattern of economic activity in Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg today as an outcome of the interaction between local inheritance norms and the
putting-out system.
We show this interaction in a standard neoclassical model of the rural economy. In the model, the
basic inheritance traditions (primogeniture or equal partition) decide the allocation of capital and
labor among families. The inheritance traditions inﬂuence the decision to allocate labor between
the agricultural and the industrial sector but also migration patterns. Inheritance traditions are
therefore decisive for population growth and industrialization of rural villages. Our model is the
1. Menchik (1980), in a similar attempt, studied the inﬂuence of inheritance traditions for the wealth distribution in the
United States.
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ﬁrst to analyze the theoretical implications of equal partition on development outcomes. Existing
theoretical research has focused on the inﬂuence of primogeniture on intergenerational inequality
and social mobility (Blinder 1973; Chu 1991).
We test this theory empirically on three different datasets. First, we use the data by Rink and Hilbig
(2018), who have digitized a map on inheritance traditions in West German municipalities in the
early 1950s based on a survey conducted by Ro¨hm (1957). We ﬁnd strong, robust, and positive
correlations between equal partition and higher municipal population density and between equal
partition and wage income in 2014. This dataset has the downside that it links the tradition in
historical municipalities with modern municipality borders. This induces the bias that territorial
reforms after 1953 affected differently developed regions differently, and thus biases the data when
economic development is the outcome. This dataset also does not include transitional or mixed
inheritance forms although they are widespread and of potential importance.
Since we are interested in regional development, we presume that credible identiﬁcation of a sin-
gle factor’s role for regional economic development for the whole of Western Germany is almost
impossible, given its history as one of the most fragmented regions in the world, the immigra-
tion of German refugees after World War II, the variation in aerial bombing, and coal and other
resources for the rise and demise of the Ruhr area. We base the core of our analysis on the dataset
by Ro¨hm (1957), and focus on the German federal state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and digitized the
borders of the 3,382 historical municipalities of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg in 1953. Focusing on Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg is interesting from a development perspective and with an eye on identiﬁcation.
It was not an early center of industrialization in Germany and remained an agrarian, rural state
until the late 19th century. Since then it has become one of the economically most prosperous
and innovative regions in Germany and the whole of Europe. It is famous for its uniquely de-
centralized industrial structure with small and mediums sized ﬁrms spread over urban and rural
areas. Baden-Wu¨rttemberg today tops the German productivity statistics in the craftmanship sec-
tor2. From the perspective of identiﬁcation, and causal inference, the focus on Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
comes with three major advantages. First, there was just a single state government. Second, its
industrialization coincided with the collection of reliable small-scale statistics. Third, it provides
us with small-scale variation in inheritance traditions including not only the basic forms but also
a lot of transitional and mixed traditions. Furthermore, Baden-Wu¨rttemberg is the only area with
an identiﬁable border between inheritance traditions in Germany, while other areas show no clear
spatial distribution patterns.
We exploit this spatial discontinuity using a fuzzy spatial RDD approach. We consider economic
outcomes from the early 1950s as dependent variables. Our fuzzy RDD results imply that equal
partition municipalities have smaller farms, are signiﬁcantly more industrialized, show higher
population densities and have more positive inter-regional migration balances. Those results are
robust to a host of robustness checks including placebo border tests, or “Donut-RDDs” (where
we leave out the border municipalities). They also remain intact when using economic outcomes
from 1961 as dependent variables and when controlling for coal and historical market potential.
A test of the degree of selection on unobservables relative to observables necessary to explain
away the results (Altonji et al. 2015), shows that remaining unobserved heterogeneity has to be
2. Statistical Ofﬁce of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, https://www.statistik-bw.de/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2016330. This
lead survives adjusting for purchasing power. Data from GfK Kaufkraft Deutschland 2015
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unlikely large (around 3 times larger as selection on observables) to undo our results. Finally,
we consider contemporary municipalities and outcomes from Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and run sharp
RDDs exploiting the historical border. We ﬁnd that contemporary municipalities in the historical
equal partition area have higher per capita incomes and industrial activity.
As a third dataset, we digitized data from Krafft (1930) and create a dataset for 1895 Wu¨rttemberg.
We ﬁnd that our results also hold for an earlier period and with different data on local inheritance
traditions. Equal partition had led to smaller farm sizes and had a positive effect on population
densities and municipal industrialization already before the turn of the century.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. In section I, we summarize the literature on
the consequences of inheritance traditions on economic development, followed by our model in
section II. In section III, we introduce our data. To link these traditions to economic development,
we provide a model in section II, and provide some empirical evidence for this idea in section IV.
We conclude in section V.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
Economic historians proposed ample theories linking inheritance practice to economic develop-
ment. O’Brien (1996) hypothesizes that landless workers, which were more prevalent in primo-
geniture England, provided the industrializing cities with cheap labor, and allowed it to overtake
France—which relied on equal partition, especially after its 1789 revolution guided by egalitarian
ideas of land distribution (see Tocqueville 1835).
An alternative view, dominant but not exclusively prevalent in the German-speaking literature
(e.g., Habakkuk 1955; Karg 1932; Ro¨hm 1957; Schro¨der 1980) is that equal partition fostered in-
dustrial development. The ﬁrst wave of rural industrialization was usually the establishment of
putting-out systems by one or more entrepreneurs who provided farmers with raw materials (e.g.
tobacco leafs), sometimes even tools, and required them to perform certain manual tasks (e.g.
rolling cigars) in a predetermined time frame.3 Wehler (2008, p. 94) argues that employees from
rural regions had two main advantages for the entrepreneurs. First, they avoided the regulation
of city guilds which were hard to get into, and had highly regulated wages and labor standards.
Second, peasants were seasonally unemployed for most of the year, and were seeking other modes
of employment, also to hedge against the risk of harvest failure. Workers were, in Wehler’s view,
exploited by low wages, long and unregulated working hours, high interests on the raw materials
to penalize lateness, and payment in kind instead of coin. All these aspects, however point at eco-
nomic development in the countryside, as the potential of the rural areas is exploited, especially in
areas were guilds were very restrictive at the time. When the factory overtook the putting-out sys-
tem, which was prevalent until the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, transport infrastructure allowed
the rural population in areas of equal partition to commute rather than to migrate.
In areas of primogeniture, putting-out systems were less successful. Siblings necessary for work-
ing on the farm were more prone to these exploitative conditions, and given their more mobile
inheritance, often in forms of animals or even money, could leave the municipality, and rather
move into cities. Hence, such areas would have been subject to a higher emigration, therefore we
3. See for example Karg (1932), who provides a detailed case study on the putting-out system and its connection to equal
partition for early 20th century Baden.
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expect these areas to be less populous.4 Among others, Wegge (1998), Karg (1932) (for Baden) and
Krafft (1930) (for Wu¨rttemberg) provide historical evidence on this out-migration from the primo-
geniture area.5 The migration from rural primogeniture areas to populous equal partition areas
put population growth on hold or into decline in the primogeniture areas but led to a popula-
tion increase in the industrializing areas of equal partition. People migrated from the agricultural
sector in the primogeniture area and engaged in industrial activities, while people who stayed in
the primogeniture area remained mostly farmers. This way, it contributed not only to structural
change in the equal partition area but also to an increase in population density there. This created
agglomeration externalities, which fostered the industrialization of the area even further.
There is a close relation of our theory to other two sector models of urban and rural labor markets,
going back to Harris and Todaro (1970). We focus however on the rural sector alone and are
interested in differences caused within this sector but across regions that apply different traditions.
We introduce our idea of inheritance traditions and the role of the putting-out system.
Another idea related to this paper is that immobile property affects economic growth, known
as the Oswald-hypothesis (Oswald 1996). Proponents of this idea believe that homeownership
induces labor market frictions, causes unemployment, and hampers economic growth.6 Our ar-
gument runs in the opposite direction. In the long run, ownership of immobile capital can foster
economic growth—given that the initial distribution of population is not inefﬁcient. In a nutshell,
our argument is that the land endowment of peasant families with in equal partition areas was of-
ten too small to subsist on it but too much to entirely abandon the farm. Therefore, they supplied
cheap and skilled labor in rural areas. This allowed these regions to industrialize, and to overtake
the primogeniture areas.
The literature on agricultural inheritance traditions (e.g., Rink and Hilbig 2018; Ro¨hm 1957) in
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg has highlighted that they were slow to adapt to the changes of the industrial
revolution and were more or less stable over time before. In Huning and Wahl (2019a) we test
this claim in a structured way, and ﬁnd suggestive evidence that the general regional patterns of
inheritance traditions have been established by the early Middle Ages.
II. A MODEL ON THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AGRICULTURAL
INHERITANCE TRADITIONS
The implications of inheritance traditions, their advantages and disadvantages, and their role for
long-run economic development are theoretically complex. Generations of individuals applying
them could not foresee all their consequences.
In a ﬁrst step, we set up a common neoclassical model with customary notation and a small rural
4. Habakkuk (1955, pp.9) highlighting the smaller migration pressure and the less mobile inheritance of children in the
equal partition area puts it like this “Where the peasant population was relatively dense but immobile, industry tended to
move to the labor; where the peasant population was more mobile even if less fertile, the industrialist had much greater
freedom to choose his site with reference to the other relevant considerations.” He also shows that the textile industry in
England ﬂourished most in East Anglia, a region where equal partition was common.
5. Sering and von Dietze (1930) provide evidence that actually, the non-inheriting children often did work outside the
agricultural sector, as civil servants or as craftsmen. If they however stayed in the rural area they often married (in the case
of daughters) into another farm, bought one or remained at the family farm to help their sibling and his family.
6. Wolf and Caruana-Galizia (2015) test this for Germany, and using an instrumental variable approach ﬁnd that home-
ownership is positively linked to unemployment.
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wage-taking world, with given technology. We take fertility as exogenous, ignore heterogeneous
preferences and heterogeneous skills, model savings as simple as possible, and rule out economics
of scale altogether. In a second step, we trace this model through three stages of economic devel-
opment. First, we sketch a Malthusian rural society in which there is no capital in the common
sense, but all material assets are employed in agriculture. In a second stage, we model the putting-
system. Capitalists enter our world from the outside and settle where the provision of labor is
cheapest. We show how capital is employed in areas of equal partition rather than primogeniture.
In our conclusion, we argue that in the modern world with and better transport technology this
pattern is likely to persist.
To abstract from individuals, our main unit of analysis is the family, which allocates resources
together, and can procreate. A family consists of a husband a wife, and children that are under
age. Once these children get to age, they leave their core family and form a new family. This new
family is distinct from its parents’ family, but remains related by blood to their parent family and
their siblings’ families. The set of all families is given by the set I = {i, j, k, ...}, and these families
live each in one village from our universe of many rural villages. We assume families have the
following stages of life
1. Marry & Inherit. A family is formed from two families’ children, of which one is endowed
with the production factors it inherits from its parents’ generation. In addition, the family
gets one unit of labor.
2. Decide where to live and work. Families maximize their income by allocating these factors
to working in manufacturing or agriculture. If they have agricultural capital (e.g. land and
tools), they have a farm. If they have other forms of capital, they can run a ﬁrm.
3. Procreate and Retire. Families get children and raise them to marriage age, to which they
pass on their production factors and live with them until they die.
The historical setting of a rural economy inspires some assumptions on the productivity of families
when working on a farm or in a ﬁrm, which depends on the relation between the employer and
the employed, and also on the distance between the village they live and work in.
1. Families that work on their own farm, or work in their own ﬁrm, have the highest produc-
tivity π = 1. This draws from the idea that parents prepare their children for their working
lives, and have a sufﬁcient level of expertise in working on their farm or in their ﬁrm.
2. Families that work on a farm or in a ﬁrm (a) owned by someone they are related with by
blood or law and (b) that lives in the same village, have a strictly lower productivity, and
we can assume from their childhood that there is also an order between brothers in terms of
productivity. When parents retire, the second oldest child has witnessed his parents work
for longer than any of his siblings, so that we can assume that his productivity is smaller,
and so forth.
3. Families from the same village but not related by blood nor law have a strictly lower produc-
tivity than anyone related to the owner of the farm or ﬁrm. They might be not acquainted
with the tasks, and might have to travel also between the work place and their home.
4. An even lower productivity have all families that have to commute to another village for
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working on a ﬁrm or in a ﬁrm, and this commuting is so costly that being related doesn’t
make a difference anymore.
1. Farms
Farms create output by combining agricultural capital S with labor. Any family i can use its
endowment with agricultural capital S ≥ 0 (the land, the tools, the barn and stable, etc.) by
employing any family j, working on this farm Lij ≥ 0, to create agricultural output f with given
labor income share α,
fi =
⎛
⎝∑
j∈I
πijL
i
j
⎞
⎠
α
S
(1−α)
i , (1)
while i can be the same family as j (a self-employed farmer). If the farms employ other families,
family j receives a wage equal its marginal product of labor,
vij =
∂Fj
∂Lij
if i = j (2)
so that the farm’s proﬁt is given by
Fi =
⎛
⎝∑
j∈I
πijL
i
j
⎞
⎠
α
S
(1−α)
i −
∑
j∈I,i =j
vijL
i
j . (3)
2. Manufacturing
Aside from agricultural capital, there is also classical capital K, utilized in ﬁrms. Firms create
output by combining it with any family’s labor Lij
∗ ≥ 0, to create output m at their family-speciﬁc
technology Ai > 1 and labor income share β,
mi = Ai
⎛
⎝∑
j∈I
πijL
i
j
∗
⎞
⎠
β
K
(1−β)
i , (4)
wages in manufacturing w are also given by the marginal product of labor,
wij =
∂mi
∂Lij
∗ , (5)
so that a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is given by
Ri = Ai
⎛
⎝∑
j∈I
πijL
i
j
∗
⎞
⎠
β
K
(1−β)
i −
∑
j∈I,i =j
wijL
i
j
∗
. (6)
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3. Land and Capital Markets
Families trade land and capital between themselves, under the following considerations.
1. Moving capital K from one village to another is costly. Capital is not held in stable cur-
rency, but needs to be mobilized, e.g. by selling off machines, or moving them physically, at
transport costs. We can assume these costs are a constant share of the units of capital sold
(iceberg-type).
2. It is also costly to sell off agricultural capital S or transfer capital between S and C. For
example, sold land might be far away from the buyer’s farm, so that for any task performed
during sowing and harvest the buyer faces long periods of traveling between lands. Addi-
tionally, the buyer needs to have the ﬁnancial means to acquire it. This induces a dilemma.
Small pieces of land ﬁnd a buyer more easily, but induce lots of traveling between ﬁelds,
larger plots are too costly for anyone, and we know that pooling ﬁnancial resources across
families was not common. Historical accounts highlight this physically induced barrier to
land markets, and speak of this as a main reason for the immobility of the peasants.
3.1 Overall Income
Altogether, families gain income Y from wages in agriculture and manufacturing, and the proﬁt
of the farm and the ﬁrm they might own,
Yi =
⎛
⎝∑
j∈I
vjiL
j
i + w
j
iL
j
i
∗
⎞
⎠+ Fi +Ri (7)
4. Saving, Consuming, and Passing Down
Families consume a share of their income, and put the rest in their savings I . Consumption is
some ﬁxed amount C0 which we refer to as subsistence, and a ﬁxed share of the excess income,
0 ≤ c < 1. A family’s savings are the sum of all forms of income: wages (in agriculture and in
manufacturing), capital and land rents,
Ii = (1− c)Yi − C0 (8)
Families gain utility by leaving behind their savings to their offspring, and seek to distribute their
savings equally across their children. They follow inheritance traditions for the distribution of
land to their children, but aim to offset the disadvantage to their children by leaving behind cap-
ital. If they are themselves endowed with land, they invest a given share of their savings a into
improvements of the farm (e.g. by purchasing more land, improve the production). All savings
they deem not necessary for the existence of the farm, they store in capital (e.g. improvement of
the family business, a house, but also liquid assets), so that a family’s endowment at the end of his
working life with soil S∗ and capital C∗ is given by
S∗i = Si + aIi K
∗
i = Ki + (1− a) Ii (9)
8
EQUAL PARTITION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Let us, for now, take that the number of children is exogenous, and unrelated to the inheritance
tradition, and test this assumption in the empirical part. Families pass down their endowments to
this number of children at the end of their working lives. They apply the tradition of their village v,
T = {0, 1} as follows.
5. Inheritance
Consider the inheritance procedure of any family h that wishes to retire, from the perspective
of family i, in its position as the nth of a total of m recipients of inheritance. The inheritance of
agricultural capital S is given by tradition. If its municipality v applies equal partition Tv = 0 then
Tv = 0 : Si =
S∗h
mh
(10)
and
Tv = 0 : Ki =
K∗h
mh
(11)
If the municipality however applies primogeniture Tv = 1, then
Tv = 1 : Si =
{
S∗h if n = 1
0 else
(12)
and
Tv = 1 : Ki =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if n = 1 and mh > 1
K∗h
mh
if n > 1 and mh > 1
K∗h if mh = 1
(13)
6. The Optimization Problem
Our families are strict incomemaximizers. Provided their subsistence consumption, are indifferent
between their own consumption and their children’ consumption,
max
(
Yi +
h∑
n=1
Yn
)
s.t.
∑
j∈I
Lji + L
j
i
∗ ≤ 1 (14)
which is given the simple structure of investment opportunities equivalent to
max (Yi) s.t.
∑
j∈I
Lji + L
j
i
∗ ≤ 1. (15)
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7. Stage 1: Malthusian Era
We start to understand economic development with classical Malthusian assumptions. For gener-
ations, fertility prohibited any savings, so there is no classical capitalK in our universe of villages,
only agricultural capital S. This implies that families
max(yi) (from (15))
max
⎛
⎝
⎛
⎝∑
j∈I
vjiL
j
i + w
j
iL
j
i
∗
⎞
⎠+ Fi +Ri
⎞
⎠ (from (7))
max
⎛
⎝
⎛
⎝∑
j∈I
vjiL
j
i + w
j
iL
j
i
∗
⎞
⎠+ Fi
⎞
⎠, (Ci=0)
the implications of which differ by inheritance tradition.
7.1 Primogeniture in Malthusian Times
Assume that a generation has just retired, and passed down the farm and with it, the oldest brother
and his family were endowed with S (eq. (12)). Since there was no capital to be inherited, this
family is the only producer among his siblings. From the property of the production function (eq.
(1)) with any other family working on the farm, the return to labor diminishes. Given their higher
productivity, it is rational to employ family members related to by blood or law. Assume that
the number of brothers is plenty, and there are several families whose wage (eq. (2)) are above
subsistence level C0, but eventually, there are families that the farm cannot nourish. Historically,
family members had to leave the farm, settling in areas where land was still available, by trying to
make a life elsewhere.7 Finally, this leaves the oldest brother’s family alone with his parents (who
have saved to subsist until they die), and the amount of brothers whose marginal product is above
subsistence, while all others leave. Cities, especially Imperial cities, provided higher wages that
rural areas since the Black Death, and were the main destination for those whose productivity on
their family farm did not allow them to subsist.
7.2 Equal Partition in Malthusian Times
The different inheritance practice during Malthusian times becomes clear when the amount of
children is above two for many generations. Following the inheritance rule
7. In Huning and Wahl (2019a), we test a couple of these historical outside options. A further discussion is provided
there.
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Si =
S∗h
mh
if Tv = 0 (eq. (10))
Si =
Sh + aIh
mh
if Tv = 0 (eq. (8))
Si =
Sh
mh
if Tv = 0 (Ih = 0)
Si < Sh if Tv = 0 (mh ≥ 2)
From which follows through induction that the endowment with soil approaches zero, and even-
tually are too small to yield output above subsistence. Again, if there are plots of land in our
universe of villages that are not utilized, these families could leave the village and settle on a new
plot of land, starting a new village. In analogy to the case of primogeniture, eventually land is
completely utilized, and these family members leave our universe of villages, again potentially to
the cities of the outside world. Compared to the primogeniture areas, the higher wage in the city
minus the costs of moving there have to be marginally higher, as all who move face the costs of
abandoning their endowment with land (at least a share of it in form of transaction costs).
7.3 Conclusion on the Malthusian Era
From these we conclude that
Lemma 1. In Malthusian times, a village with primogeniture consists only of retired families, their
oldest child, and other families they are related to by blood or law, which produce output above
their subsistence level.
A village with equal partition consists only of retired families, and children that were each en-
dowed with enough land to subsist on. Eventually, all land is utilized for agricultural production,
and the distribution of across all available land villages is equal, with population density solely
determined by the suitability of the land S.
Comparing the endowment of generation two and following generations yields
Lemma 2. Compared to villages of equal partition, villages of primogeniture has larger land hold-
ings per family, and more families helping on farms owned by other families they are related to
by blood or law.
8. Stage 2: Putting-out System
Assume that our universe of villages was in stage one for some generations, and then enter some
families with capital endowment C = 1, we call these families capitalists, and a common technol-
ogyA > 1. These families choose their village they settle in freely, and locate where they maximize
their output. Consider family i interested in founding a ﬁrm,
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max(yi) (from (15))
max
⎛
⎝
⎛
⎝∑
j∈I
vjiL
j
i + w
j
iL
j
i
∗
⎞
⎠+ Fi +Ri
⎞
⎠ (from (7))
max
⎛
⎝
⎛
⎝∑
j∈I
vjiL
j
i + w
j
iL
j
i
∗
⎞
⎠+Ri
⎞
⎠ (Fi = 0)
Assume that the number of capitalists is small enough to settle far away from each other, and
that technology A is sufﬁciently developed enough in relation to productivity π for working for
people they are not related with, to ensure that all capitalists work exclusively for their ﬁrm, this
becomes
max(yi) = (Ri) (Si = 0, Lii
∗
= 1)
max
⎛
⎜⎝Ai
⎛
⎝∑
j∈I
πijL
i
j
∗
⎞
⎠
β
K
(1−β)
i −
∑
j∈I,i =j
wijL
i
j
∗
⎞
⎟⎠ (from (4))
This yields the two conditions that capitalists focus on, namely (1) that the quantity of labor supply
is sufﬁcient (2) at sufﬁcient productivity π. These factors differ between primogeniture and equal
partition, according to the discussion of the Malthusian stage. Therefore, capitalists initially settle
distant from each other, so they do not compete with each other over labor, but close enough
to the labor supply. We focus on labor supply to understand the difference between inheritance
traditions.
8.1 Primogeniture and the Putting-Out System
Consider the maximization problem of family i. Apart from their old job, working on k’s farm,
they can now also gain income by working in j’s ﬁrm,
max(yi) (from (15))
max
⎛
⎝
⎛
⎝∑
j∈I
vjiL
j
i + w
j
iL
j
i
∗
⎞
⎠+ Fi +Ri
⎞
⎠ (from (7))
max
⎛
⎝
⎛
⎝∑
j∈I
vjiL
j
i + w
j
iL
j
i
∗
⎞
⎠+ Fi
⎞
⎠ (Ci = 0)
max
(
vki L
k
i + w
j
iL
j
i
∗
+ Fi
)
(I = {i, j, k})
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Assume that manufacturing technology is low enough that for the owner of the farm, i = k, it can-
not be proﬁtable to reduce the amount of labor used there. Assuming that the farm employs other
families, any labor the owner takes out of his farm reduces its overall output. This rationalizes the
idea that heirs in primogeniture areas stay in agriculture full-time, without side employment in
manufacturing. Any landless family i maximizes
max
(
vki L
k
i + w
j
iL
j
i
∗)
(I = {i, j, k}, Si = 0,Ki = 0)
which means they are indifferent between working in agriculture and manufacturing exactly
when
vki L
k
i = w
j
iL
j
i
∗
and therefore
∂
(
πki L
k
i
)α
S
(1−α)
k
∂Lki
Lki =
∂
(
Ai
(
πjiL
j
i
∗)β
K
(1−β)
i
)
∂Lji
∗ L
j
i
∗
(
πki L
k
i
)α
S
(1−α)
k = Ai
(
πjiL
j
i
∗)β
K
(1−β)
i , (from (15))
while most of the implications come from the deﬁnition of productivity.
Lemma 3. Landless families in the primogeniture area supplies labor, conditional on one, or com-
bination of the factors (2) a large enough inﬂow of capital relative to (a) the endowment with
agricultural capital and (b) the families working for the farm they work on, (2) a large enough
level of manufacturing technology, (3) a small enough productivity reduction for working for a
capitalist they are not related to by blood or law, and (4) provided they do not have to travel too
far to work in the ﬁrm.
8.2 Equal Partition and the Putting-Out System
From the Malthusian stage, we know that in the equal partition area all families optimize like the
oldest brother of the primogeniture area. We know however that they should have considerably
less land, their farm makes a lower proﬁt even if they are the only family working on the farm (eq.
(3)), and the main reason why they did not leave their village was the loss they suffer from when
selling their land. Concerning all the factors from 3, we conclude the following.
Lemma 4. Ceteris paribus, families from villages where equal partition is applied provide labor
to (1) capitalists with less capital, (2) less sophisticated technology, (3) even if they incur higher
reduction in productivity when working for capitalists they are not related to by blood or law, or
(4) travel further to reach a workplace, or any combination of the above.
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8.3 Conclusion on the Putting-Out System, and Dynamics
To conclude, capitalists in a putting-out system locate where labor supply is large enough, and
this is the margin more likely the case in areas of equal partition.
Lemma 5. Labor supply for capitalists is higher in villages with equal partition, compared to
primogeniture ones, and therefore settle more likely in villages of equal partition.
Consider any family i that provides labor to the capitalists. Assume that the family’s endowments
were such that there were no savings in the generation before, Yi = C0, the new source of income
should therefore allow savings (eq. 8), so that Ii > 0. This allow them to improve the farm,
but given that land is completely utilized, there are limits to investing in S. It is therefore safe
to assume that the family does not invest all savings into the farm (a < 1), or in the case of a
landless family in the primogeniture area in establishing an own farm to begin with, so that the
next generation is endowed with capital, besides the factors its parents were endowed with. From
lemma 5, it follows that this effect is strongest in villages of equal partition.
This implies an increase in the number of capitalists, and since those who work for the capital-
ists gain all the capital, we expect capital to be more and more unequally distributed across our
villages. Families whose grandparents were working on their own land, their parents acquiring
capital from working for the entered capitalists, can employ other families themselves, provided
they can reach the same level of technology as their parents’ employer. This captures the idea that
in areas of thriving industry, we expect also the initially completely agricultural population to join
the ranks of capitalists, which is recorded especially for the putting-out system. The decision of
a capitalist to settle in any village in any generation implies an increase in capital holdings in the
same village in the next generation.
The fact that families accumulate capital which formerly were without capital has implications
for the villages around it. Consider the case of a family that lives on their parents’ farm, and
the parents were marginally too distant from capitalists to be attracted. The rising wages attract
this family, given the increase in capital stock, because labor becomes scarcer relative to capital.
Villages which are very distant from the initial capitalists, remains unchanged, but the distance at
which families are indifferent increases.
Lemma 6. There is more capital accumulated in villages of equal partition compared to villages of
primogeniture, ceteris paribus—and the distribution of capital across villages is more unequal in
areas with equal land partition. Assuming common technology for all families, capital distribution
within villages becomes more equal over the generations.
9. Conclusion on the Model
Introducing capital leads to a new option, especially for landless families. They cannot only com-
mute to villages in their proximity, but lemma 6 implies also a more unequal distribution of wages
between villages. The increase in income experienced from moving to another village and live
there should be initially the highest for landless families, provided that the costs of physically
moving to an area with capitalists are small. This should induce migration from primogeniture
areas to areas of equal partition.
Further technical progress has rendered the putting-out system obsolete in modern Germany. We
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can rationalize this by assuming that knowledge spillovers, or technical progress, has given some
capitalists a better technology A, which then allows them to pay higher wages, and motivate cap-
italists with weaker technology to stop producing, instead working for them. Another reason in
the model could be that the productivity loss incurred by commuting decreases, which is plausi-
ble in the light of advancement in transport infrastructure and technology over the 19th century
Germany. To conclude, these are the ideas we draw from the model that we take to the data:
Theorem. In areas of equal partition, we expect (1) a higher population density, (2) smaller farms, (3) less
family members helping in agriculture, (4) more manufacturing, and (5) less outmigration, ceteris paribus.
III. DATA
1. Inheritance Traditions
The core of our analysis relies on municipality level data on agricultural inheritance traditions in
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg as assembled by Ro¨hm (1957). After World War II, the federal state of Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg was founded with 3,382 municipalities, each on average only 10.56km2 in size.8 In
1953, Ro¨hm sent a one-page questionnaire to each municipality’s major. Questions included the
predominant inheritance tradition in the municipality at the time, but also its historical origin.
Respondents had to decide between a ‘main form’ (Hauptform), primogeniture or equal partition,
but could also choose from different transitional and mixed forms. A transitional form could be
that small farms were subject to equal partition, while primogeniture applied for large farms. He
also asked the majors whether their municipality switched from one main form to the other within
the last hundred years, and if so, which was the ‘original form’. Only 22 municipalities (0.7 % of
all municipalities) experienced such a change in the main form between 1850 and today. This
suggests that the traditions were relatively persistent.9 If the majors indicated that a transitional
or mixed form was prevalent they were also asked for the ‘original’ form, either primogeniture
or equal partition. An outcome of the survey was that there were almost no transitional or mixed
forms in 1850. This supports the claim made by many historians that most of the transitional forms
have emerged only during the 20th century (Ro¨hm 1957; Krafft 1930; Sering and von Dietze 1930).
Based on the information about the origins of mixed forms and about switches in the main form
between 1850 and 1953, he drew the border (which he called “historical main border of inheritance
rules”) between the main forms, which we exploit using a spatial RDD approach. He has drawn
the border in a way that it separates the area in which only equal partition was the originally
prevalent inheritance tradition from the area in which only primogeniture was the original form
(with exclaves of the respective other form as exceptions). The downside of this approach is that
it relies on the best knowledge of the majors, and to a minor extent also on their honesty.10 We
compare his data with other data collected earlier, to be sure that this is not a crucial issue.
The questionnaire also inquired whether commons existed and if so, if they were partitioned. The
survey resulted in a map depicting for each municipality, one of nine predominant inheritance
traditions each with a different color or shading (Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix shows the
8. The following paragraphs draw heavily from Huning and Wahl (2019a), a companion paper of ours in which we
introduce the inheritance data in more detail.
9. In the majority of the switches, municipalities went from equal partition to primogeniture.
10. Eight years after the Nazi time, this could be a bias, because the political debate emphasized primogeniture as the
‘true’ Germanic, and therefore superior, tradition.
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original map). It distinguishes nine inheritance practices however six of them are transitional
forms of primogeniture or equal partition and there is also a mixed tradition, we aggregate these
nine to ﬁve different inheritance traditions.11 For the following empirical analysis, we however
study only the impact of one of them, equal partition, compared to all the others.
We use maps on the prevalence of inheritance traditions from 1905 as printed in Krafft (1930) and
Sering and von Dietze (1930) to check the validity of Ro¨hm’s map. It distinguishes only between
the two basic forms of equal partition and primogeniture and mixed traditions and is based on
a survey of the ministry of law of Wu¨rttemberg asking notaries about the inheritance traditions
prevalent in their jurisdiction. The map largely conﬁrms the location of the border andStandard
errors are clustered on county level that mixed traditions were less prevalent in 1905.12
Figure 1(a) shows a map of contemporary West German municipalities and whether they applied
equal partition (blue) or primogeniture (red) in 1953. We base those map on the dataset of the
Rink and Hilbig (2018) study. Figure 1(b) depicts Krafft’s map from 1905, where equal partition
municipalities are blue, primogeniture ones are red and mixed ones are orange. Figure 1(c) shows
the digitized version of Ro¨hm’s map, colorized by inheritance tradition. Primogeniture is the most
frequent, prevalent in roughly 38 % of all municipalities; transitional and mixed forms apply in
around 1⁄3 of the municipalities. Figures 1(b) and (c) also show that there are several exclaves,
municipalities that apply a tradition different from all its neighbors.
2. Dependent Variables and Controls
Our data on industrialization, agriculture, employment structure and basic demography rely on
the ofﬁcial municipal and county statistics of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg from 1950 and 1961 (“Gemeinde-
undKreisstatistik Baden-Wu¨rttemberg”). Themunicipal statistics of 1950 also report population in
1939. For information on part-time farmers, we rely on the municipal statistics from 1971/72 (Sta-
tistical Ofﬁce of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 1952, 1964, 1974). These two years are the most chronological
closest to Ro¨hm’s survey. Not all information is available both in 1950 and 1961 (for example, we
only have the migration balance for 1950). For the baseline analysis, we stick to the situation in
1950, the year closest to Ro¨hm’s survey. In both 1950 and 1961, the number of municipalities differs
slightly from that in 1953, as some few municipalities were merged or created in between.13
We also use contemporary data. Asatryan, Havlik, and Streif (2017) provide us with the share
of industry buildings per municipality in 2010 and income per capita in 2006 (the last full year
before the world ﬁnancial crisis) for 1,105 municipalities. We also use the areas of municipality’s
industrial zones, which we extract from openstreetmap.org.14
11. The application of one or the other tradition was not restricted by any laws, the standard German inheritance law
was that the farm owners would be free in their will. If farmers wished to apply primogeniture they had to register their
farms in the “Ho¨ferolle”, a trade register for farms, expressing their will that primogeniture law of the respective state is
applied. If they changed their mind, they still could pass the farm in another way. Farms were usually passed down to the
children during the lifetime of the parents, at parents age around 60 (Krafft 1930), so that the oldest son would be around
25 years old (Karg 1932).
12. We also had a look on the maps depicted in Huppertz (1939) and Karg (1932) to get an idea about the accuracy of
Ro¨hm’s map. From the comparison, we conclude that Ro¨hm’s map is accurate and the most detailed available.
13. For 1971/72, the number of municipalities is much lower (around 1,200) as in 1971, a fundamental reform of the
administrative regions was conducted with the results that a lot of counties and municipalities were merged together and
the number of municipalities decreased by around 2/3. We do also not have each information for all the municipalities,
which can also lead to a slightly smaller number of observations than 3,382 in some regressions.
14. Our data represents the state of 10th March 2019, 12pm. We extracted the polygon shapeﬁle by using the QGIS plug-in
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Our control variables originate from a large variety of data sources. To outline our main variables,
the share of a municipality’s area that is used to grow wine or fruits with intensive agriculture
we take from the ofﬁcial municipal statistics of 1961. Data on the location of pre-medieval forest
areas were digitized from a map by Ellenberg (1990). Most historical control variables (Distance
to the closest Imperial city, historical political instability and fragmentation, location in church
territories) were taken from Huning and Wahl (2019b). Talbert (2000) provides the distance of
a municipality to the next certain Roman road network. Data on the location of Celtic graves,
and 19th railway lines is taken from maps in the “Historischer Atlas von Baden-Wu¨rttemberg”
(Historical Atlas of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg) which we have digitized (Kommission fu¨r geschichtliche
Landeskunde in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 1988). The shape of the French occupation zones comes from
Schumann (2014).
We provide a descriptive overview of all the variables in the Online Appendix in Table A.1 (for the
dataset with municipalities as of 1953) and Table A.2 (for contemporary municipalities).
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF AGRICULTURAL
INHERITANCE TRADITIONS
1. Results for ContemporaryMunicipalities andOutcomes inWest Germany
We ﬁrst study the effect of equal partition on economic development for the whole of West Ger-
many, using data from Rink and Hilbig (2018). They digitized a map drawn by Ro¨hm in the
publication “Atlas der deutschen Agrarlandschaft”, with data from a survey for all West German
municipalities (for more details see Rink and Hilbig (2018)). They code the inheritance traditions
for contemporary West German municipalities by overlaying Ro¨hm’s map with a shapeﬁle of con-
temporary municipalities. Then they count the number of pixels within each current municipality
associated with either inheritance tradition. The authors assign the inheritance tradition with the
highest share of pixels to a contemporary municipality.15 A dummy variable is obtained which
is equal to one if a contemporary municipality in 1953 applied equal partition. Figure 1(a) shows
West Germany, the borders of contemporary federal states and municipalities. In the ﬁgure, mu-
nicipalities with equal partition in 1953 are blue and the ones applying primogeniture are red.
A look at the map makes clear that equal partition was present mostly in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg,
Rhineland Palatine, the Saarland and the south of Hesse. It was virtually absent in Bavaria and
the north of Germany. Baden-Wu¨rttemberg was the only state with closed equal partition and pri-
mogeniture areas. All other states were scattered. We use this advantage of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
to employ a spatial RDD approach.
Their dataset also contains a host of geographical and historical control variables alongside con-
temporary socio-economic outcomes (measured in 2014). Among those, the average wage income
and population density are relevant for our analysis. These two will be the dependent variables
in OLS regressions with the equal partition dummy as variable of interest and following historical
and geographic control variables: A municipality’s distance to Wittenberg, average elevation, the
intensity of the Peasant Wars of 1522-1525 in the historical state of the municipality, and dummy
QuickOSM.
15. In order to arrive at a dichotomous measure, they treat transitional forms of equal partition as equal partition and
transitional forms of primogeniture as primogeniture.
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variables for historical states of the German Empire of 1871, for municipalities historically located
in the Roman part of Germany, and in which the code civil was the prevailing law in 1894.16 We
include either federal state or county ﬁxed effects into the regressions.
Table 1 reports results of the OLS regressions. Regardless of which combination of ﬁxed effects and
control variables, equal partition municipalities have a statistically and economically signiﬁcantly
higher population density (around 15 to 58 %) and higher average wage incomes (around 1.6 to 5
%). In conclusion, the results conﬁrm that there is a positive relationship between equal partition
and municipal economic prosperity in today’s West Germany.
Table 1: Equal Partition and Current Municipal Development in West Germany
Dependent Variable ln(Population Density 2014) ln(Average Wage Income 2014)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Equal Partition 0.567*** 0.325*** 0.154*** 0.0468*** 0.0211*** 0.0159***
(0.0754) (0.065) (0.054) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Federal State Dummies Yes No No Yes No No
Latitude and Longitude Yes No No Yes No No
County Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Further Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 4,021 4,021 4,001 7,977 7,977 7,896
R2 0.183 0.504 0.579 0.132 0.388 0.405
Notes. Standard errors are clustered on county (Landkreis) level are in parentheses. Coefﬁcient is statistically different
from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a municipality in 2014. All regressions include a
constant not reported. Controls include a municipality’s distance to Wittenberg, average elevation, a variable reporting the
intensity to which the county in which a municipality is located was involved in the Peasant Wars of 1522-1525, dummy
variables for historical states of the German Empire of 1871, for municipality’s historically located in the Roman part of
Germany, for municipalities in which the code civil was the prevailing civil code in 1894.
2. Consequences of Equal Partition in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg in 1950
2.1 OLS Results
We move the focus of our analysis to the state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg in 1950, and study the effect
of equal partition on municipality level population and industry ﬁrm density (ﬁrms per hectare),
industrial and agricultural employment shares, and migration balance per capita. We estimate the
following equation using OLS:
Outcomes,m =α+ βEqualPartitions,m + γ
′Xs,m + δs + s,m (16)
Where Outcomes,m represents one of the ﬁve measure of industrialization, structural change and
inter-regional migration in municipalitym in border segment s mentioned above. Xs,m is a vector
of control variables. We include geographic and historical variables to control for confounding
variation representing the determinants of agricultural inheritance traditions studied in our com-
panion paper (Huning and Wahl 2019a). We include controls of pre-historic/ancient (and there-
fore pre-treatment) measures of economic development, urbanization and settlement history. This
16. For descriptive statistics of those variables, the reader is referred to the Data Appendix of the Rink and Hilbig (2018)
paper.
19
EQUAL PARTITION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
accounts for persistence of deep historical factors of development. The geographic covariates in-
clude mean elevation, terrain ruggedness, soil suitability and the share of agricultural area used
to grow wine and fruits in 1961, and distance to Rhine or Neckar.
Historical controls encompass distance to the closest Imperial city as of 1556, distance to next cer-
tain Roman road, a dummy variable for municipalities with at least one Celtic grave, historical
political fragmentation and instability, the share of a municipalities total area that is located in
ecclesiastical territories in 1556, pre-medieval forest areas, the share of Protestants in 1961 and
a dummy for municipalities which belonged to the Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg in 1789. We also
add a measure for distance to the closest urban center (either Freiburg, Heidelberg, Karlsruhe,
Mannheim or Stuttgart), and to the rivers Rhine or the Neckar. This addresses concerns of prox-
imity to a large agglomeration or to major rivers in the border’s vicinity. Furthermore, we include
a dummy variable equal to one if a municipality was located in the French Occupation Zone after
World War II. This allows us to control for the argument by Schumann (2014) who shows that the
occupational zones led to discontinuous population growth until the 1970s (because the French
objected to any immigration from territories Germany lost to Poland).
Some of these control variables are potentially bad controls. The potential bias from not control-
ling for these factors however is likely larger than the bias that could arise from bad controls. We
also add 25 border segment ﬁxed effects (δs) to the estimation to further reduce unobserved het-
erogeneity.17 We include all control variables in all of the estimations. s,m is the error term. Table 2
shows the results.
For all the dependent variables except the migration balance per capita, we ﬁnd that equal parti-
tion has an economically and statistically signiﬁcant effect. For example, the number of ﬁrms per
hectare is on average around 12% larger in the equal partition areas, and the share of workers in
the industrial sector is on average around 4% higher.
Despite the comprehensive set of control variables, there could be a bias of the OLS estimates
because of omitted variables. We therefore propose an alternative strategy to identify the causal
relationship between equal partition and our outcomes of interest. This identiﬁcation strategy
comes with its own challenges, but convinces in combination with the OLS results. In what fol-
lows, we argue that the historical border of inheritance traditions as depicted in the map of Ro¨hm
is a valid border in a spatial RDD and henceforth enables us to eliminate potential biases arising
from unobserved heterogeneity.
17. We create those in the following way: We split the border into 25 equally large segments and then each municipality
is assigned to the segment it is closest to.
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2.2 Identiﬁcation Challenges
The validity of a spatial RDD rests on three assumptions. The border is drawn in an (economically)
unsystematic way, there is no compound treatment, and there is no selective sorting (manipula-
tion of the running variable). Of those three, the ﬁrst two are the most critical in our context.18
The most crucial assumption is that the border is not endogenous to any unobserved factors and
hence not drawn in a systematic way. We cannot proof the validity of this assumption, but we can
test whether relevant observables vary smoothly at the border. If this is not the case, it shows that
the border is systematic, meaning it is located in an area where relevant characteristics change dis-
continuously. As depicted in Figure 1(c), the border in the southeast, shaped like an inverted U, is
almost identical to the Black Forest. This border reﬂects discontinuous changes in other variables,
such as elevation and other characteristics of relevance. Therefore, we exclude this border from
the analysis. We also exclude the small, northern primogeniture area, since it has a long border
with another state, Hesse. What remains is the eastern part of the border, stretching roughly from
the south to the north of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, with a slight eastern-wards tendency. Ro¨hm (1957)
already noted that apparent geographical or historical features cannot explain this segment of the
border. From a historical point of view, one concern is that the line was not absolutely exogenous,
as we know the exact mechanism that determined it. This makes our cultural border not a typical
case for a spatial RDD, like an exogenously drawn political border would be.19
Regarding the determinants of the border, Schro¨der (1980) and Huppertz (1939) argue that cul-
tural diffusion and imitation played a decisive role in the spread of equal partition in particular.
Schro¨der (1980) develops the argument that equal partition occurred ﬁrst in the wine-growing ar-
eas, either as original development —or as suggested by others, based on Germanic traditions or
Roman ideas of property—and spread from there fast in a classical process of cultural diffusion
through imitation.20 The presence of exclaves, and a lot of transitional forms along the border that
is suggested by the results of Huning and Wahl (2019a) support this reasoning.21 Schro¨der (1980)
further backs this argument by showing that equal partition emerged spontaneously in some ar-
eas of the duchy of Wu¨rttemberg. Together with the fact there seems to be no discontinuities in
natural factors like soil quality or elevation along the border, this suggests that the historical bor-
der resulted from idiosyncratic circumstances, which put historical diffusion in the municipalities
nowadays located along the border on halt.Residuals from a regression in our companion paper
(Huning and Wahl 2019a), where we explain the equal partition area support this notion too.22
Figure 3 visualizes them. Darker shades of red display higher residuals. The residuals of the pre-
diction are largest around the border, implying that this area is among the locations in which we
can predict equal partition least good.
18. Selective sorting usually is an important issue when people are aware of the fact that treatment occurs at a certain
value of the running variable, i.e. income or can manipulate their own values of the running variable accordingly leading to
a higher density of observations around the threshold. In our case, the observations are municipalities and not individuals
and the border is fuzzy and implicit making it unlikely that this is a big issue.
19. A prime example for a completely exogenous border are the African borders drawn in Berlin, see Michalopoulos
(2012). For most European borders, endogeneity has been demonstrated by a variety of authors (Wolf, Schulze, and Heine-
meyer 2011; Suesse 2018) however studies using RDD on them are as plentiful.
20. We discuss this idea and empirically test it in Huning and Wahl (2019a).
21. Ro¨hm (1957) puts it differently in saying that from today’s perspective inheritance traditions seem to result from
arbitrariness and randomness. From historical perspective, he argues, they seem to be characteristics of the cultural of the
area, which are transmitted from generation to generation.
22. The residuals originate from an OLS estimation of the probit regression in Table 1 of the companion paper.
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For the eastern border segment, we show that relevant observables are continuous. We run spa-
tial RDD estimations for a ﬁve and a ten kilometer buffer area around the border and also for the
municipalities immediately to the left and right of the border only. As running variable, we intro-
duce a linear distance polynomial measuring distance to the border. We cluste standard errors on
county level. We consider ten relevant, geographic, ancient, medieval and contemporary variables
as dependent ones. Among those are all the variables signiﬁcantly predicting the equal partition
area in Huning and Wahl (2019a) and, additionally the share of Protestants in 1950. Figure 2 re-
ports the results. It shows the coefﬁcient of the equal partition area dummy and 95 % conﬁdence
intervals. We do not detect a signiﬁcant discontinuity of these variables at the border.23 This re-
assures us that at least a speciﬁcation with only comparing municipalities directly at the border
leads to a valid spatial RDD.
Note: The ﬁgures show coefﬁcients of the equal partition area dummy resulting from spatial RDD regressions for several bandwidth and
dependent variables using a linear distance polynomial. In the case of the border municipalities sample, the coefﬁcient is just the result of a
bivariate OLS regression. The shown conﬁdence intervals are 95 % conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 2: Testing for Discontinuities in Observables at the Border
23. In the case of soil quality, the equal split area dummy would become signiﬁcant at 10 % level when focusing on
the border municipalities only. The marginally signiﬁcant coefﬁcient however would then be just because of two small
municipalities on the primogeniture side of the border that have extremely low soil quality values. If we remove those two
municipalities, the coefﬁcient turns insigniﬁcant.
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No compound treatment means that the border between the equal partition and the primogeniture
areas is not identical to any other existing or historical border of relevance. To show that this is the
case, Figure 4(a) depicts the eastern part of the equal partition border and the area of the three pre-
decessor states of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (Baden, Hohenzollern, and Wu¨rttemberg). The border is
different to one of those states and in fact cuts right through the middle of both Wu¨rttemberg (dark
blue) and Hohenzollern (light blue) with small but signiﬁcant share of territory in the southeast of
Baden (gray). It is also not identical to the border of the French occupation zone after World War
II (the bold black line). Despite this, we include a dummy for municipalities in the French Zone to
all the regressions. The border is also distinct from to the course of the two relevant rivers, Rhine
and Neckar—although its course to some extent mirrors those of the Neckar ﬂowing in the middle
of the state. To rule out that this biases our results, we control for distance to Rhine and Neckar in
our spatial RDD speciﬁcations.
Figures 4(b) and (c) overlay the borders of historical states in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg in 1648 (after
the Peace of Westphalia) and 1789 (close to the French Revolution). They also show the location
of Imperial cities (red) and ecclesiastical territories (blue). We can infer from those ﬁgures that the
border is also not identical to those of historical states, especially not to important ones that are
relevant for inheritance traditions like the historical Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg (which was the large
state in the center of the area). We nevertheless include a dummy formunicipalities in the Duchy of
Wu¨rttemberg in 1789, and as a robustness check, a complete set of historical state dummies.
Note: The ﬁgure shows residuals of a linear probability model explaining the historical equal partition area. The darker red the
municipalities are colored, the higher is the residual.
Figure 3: Predicted Equal Partition Area, Prediction Residuals and the Historical Inheritance Border
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(a) The Eastern Historical Main Bor-
der of Inheritance Practices, Historical
States and Major Rivers
(b) The Historical Border and States
1648
(c) The Historical Border and States
1789
Note: Figure (a) shows the eastern part of the historical border of the equal partition, and the borders of the historical states forming
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (Baden, Hohenzollern and Wu¨rttemberg) and two major rivers Rhine and Neckar. Figures (b) and (c) show the eastern
border of equal partition and the historical states in 1648 (a) and 1789 (b), and secular states are depicted in gray, city states in red, and
ecclesiastical states in blue.
Figure 4: Maps of important control variables on historical borders and rivers
2.3 Estimation Approach
Intuitively, the idea of our identiﬁcation strategy is to model municipal economic development as
function of distance to the border. If equal partition has a positive effect, we expect a signiﬁcant
upward shift in the intercept of that function at the border. We estimate this shift in the intercept
using a spatial RDD approach or Boundary Discontinuity Design (BDD). A BDD is a special case of
a standard RDD but with a two-dimensional forcing variable (Keele and Titiunik 2014). Because of
the transitional forms, we estimate a fuzzy BDD. This allows us to use the course of the border to
identify municipalities located either in the equal partition area or in the primogeniture area. We
then use this variable to instrument actual prevalence of equal partition with location in the equal
partition area. A fuzzy BDD amounts to estimating a standard 2SLS model including a variable
measuring the distance from each municipality to the closest border segment. We estimate the
following equations:
EqualPartitions,m =α1 + β1EqualPartitionAreas,m + f(Dm) + γ
′
1Xs,m + δs + s,m (17a)
Outcomes,m =α2 + β2 ̂EqualPartitions,m + f(Dm) + γ
′
2Xs,m + ζs + ηs,m (17b)
Where EqualPartitionAreas,m is a binary variable that indicates whether municipality m in bor-
der segment s was located in the historical area of equal partition inheritance practices. This vari-
able is used as instrument for the potentially endogenous dummy EqualPartitions,m which is
equal to one if a municipality applied equal partition of agricultural inheritance by 1953. Here
f(Dm) is a ﬂexible linear function of the geodesic distance of each municipality’s border to the
closest point on the eastern part of the historical border. ‘Flexible’ means that we allow the dis-
tance polynomial to differ in the treated and non-treated area by interacting the distance terms
with the treatment variable. Outcomes,m are various socio-economic outcome variables in border
25
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segment s in 1950 or 1961, depending on the availability of data. Xs,m is a vector of control vari-
ables. We introduce the control variables below alongside the presentation of the results. They are
however identical to those used for the OLS regressions of Table 2. δs and ζs represent ﬁve border
segment ﬁxed effects.
The standard spatial RDD, using geodesic distance to the border as running variable, has the re-
striction that it does not take into account that municipalities with the same geodesic distance
to border can be far away from each other (because the north-south direction is not taken into ac-
count). Introducing border segment ﬁxed effects does already mitigate this problem. Additionally,
we follow Dell (2010) and treat the border as a two-dimensional threshold to control for the exact
geographic location of a municipality (its longitude and latitude). We modify the 2SLS estimation
as follows:
EqualPartitions,m =α1 + β1EqualPartitionAreas,m + f(xm, ym) + γ
′
1Xs,m + δs + s,m (18a)
Outcomes,m =α2 + β2 ̂EqualPartitions,m + f(xm, ym) + γ
′
2Xs,m + ζs + ηs,m (18b)
With f(xm, ym) we have a ﬂexible function of a municipalities minimum longitudinal and latitu-
dinal coordinates (xm and ym). We use a linear coordinates polynomial.24
We apply a semi-parametric operationalization of the fuzzy BDD, using three different band-
widths (buffer areas) around the border for the estimation of the sample. These are ten and ﬁve
kilometers, and lastly only municipalities directly at the western and eastern side of the border.
Figure 5(a) shows the estimation samples corresponding to the three different buffer areas. Fig-
ure 5(b) shows which municipality is assigned to which of the ﬁve border segments. We cluster
the standard errors on county level to account for likely spatial correlation of inheritance prac-
tices, and outcomes. In robustness checks, we also show that the results are robust to the use of
quadratic distance polynomials. We exclude exclave municipalities of the respective other inheri-
tance practice from all estimations.
24. To be precise, the polynomial has the following form: f(x, y) = x+ y + xy.
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(a) Buffer Areas around the Eastern Main Border (b) Border Segments around the Eastern Main Border
Note: These ﬁgures show the eastern part of the historical border of equal and unequal partition inheritance areas. In panel (a)
municipalities to the left and right of the border are depicted in gray, those ﬁve kilometers away from the border are depicted in light-blue
and those ten kilometer away in dark-blue. Panel (b) shows how municipalities in the buffer area are assigned to one of ﬁve border
segments to which they are closest.
Figure 5: Buffer Areas and Border Segments around the Historical Main Border of Inheritance Practices
2.4 Consequences of Equal Partition for the Structure of the Agricultural Sector
Consider the consequences of inheritance traditions on the structure of agriculture in the 1950s.
Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation 17 with border segment ﬁxed effects and no other
controls. We estimate the BDD for a ten kilometer buffer area around the eastern border of the
equal partition area. We include four different dependent variables, including two measures of
farm size (share of large farms and farms per hectare), the share of helping family members in all
employees in 1950, and common land as reported by Ro¨hm (1957). Ro¨hm (1957) argues that com-
mon lands are more frequent in equal partition municipalities as they make it easier to maintain
it. As expected, farms are on average signiﬁcantly smaller in the equal partition area, there are
fewer family members working on the farms and the probability that common land is present in
a municipality is signiﬁcantly higher. It is also worth noticing that the F-value of the equal par-
tition area dummy in the ﬁrst stage is very high all the time and well above the commonly used
threshold of ten. This makes it a likely candidate for an instrument.
It is essential for our argument that the putting-out system was more widespread in the equal
partition area than in the areas of primogeniture. We cannot test that directly, but we have data
from the early 1970s, which allow us to test whether there are more part-time farmers in the equal
partition area. If this is true it would imply that those part-time farmers also work as craftsmen or
in the industrial sector when they do not engage in agricultural activities (e.g., during the winter).
As this argument is essential for our story, we test this by running the BDD as before but this time
we also include control variables and use a linear coordinates polynomial as additional forcing
variable. We rely on the ten kilometer buffer to keep up the number of observations.
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Table 3: Equal Partition and its Consequences for the Structure of Agriculture in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg in
1950
Dependent Variable Share of
Farms>40ha
Farms per Acre Share of Helping
Family Members 1950
Commons
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Buffer Area 10km around the border
Equal Partition -0.543*** 14.42*** -0.121*** 0.567***
(0.124) (3.889) (0.0348) (0.179)
Linear Dist. Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes
Border Segment FEs    
F-Value of Excluded IV 50.48 50.48 50.35 50.46
Observations 869 869 869 870
R2 0.04 0.09 0.054 0.088
Notes. Standard errors are clustered on county (Landkreis) level are in parentheses. Coefﬁcient is statistically different from
zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a municipality in 1953. The F-Value of Excluded IVs refers
to the F-values of the equal partition area dummy as instrument for equal partition in 1953 on the ﬁrst stage. R2 is the centered
R2 of the second stage.
Table 4: Equal Partition and Part-time Farmers in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg in 1972
Dependent Variable Part-time
Farmers (Share)
Mainly part-time
farmers (Share)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Buffer Area All Obs. 10km 10km 10km
Panel A: Linear Distance Polynomial
Equal Partition 0.120*** 0.218*** 0.233*** 0.459***
(0.016) (0.079) (0.09) (0.103)
F-Value of Excluded IV 921.86 40.99 29.85 40.11
R2 0.097 0.157 0.282 0.09
Panel B: Linear Coordinates Polynomial
Equal Partition 0.122*** 0.191*** 0.275*** 0.429***
(0.02) (0.053) (0.085) (0.065)
F-Value of Excluded IV 604.05 80.67 29.06 83.27
R2 0.114 0.26 0.223 0.029
Border Segment FEs    
Geographic Controls – –  –
Historical Controls – –  –
French OZ Dummy – –  –
Distance to Urban Center – –  –
Intersects Major Railway – –  –
Intersects Minor Railway – –  –
Observations 1,114 316 314 322
Notes. Standard errors are clustered on county (Landkreis) level are in parentheses. Coefﬁcient is statis-
tically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a municipality
in 1953. All regressions include a constant not reported. R2 is the centered R2 of the second stage. Ge-
ographic controls include mean elevation, terrain ruggedness and soil suitability as well as the share of
agricultural area used to grow wine and fruits in 1961, and distance to Rhine or Neckar. Historical controls
encompass distance to the closest Imperial city as of 1556, distance to next certain Roman road, a dummy
variable for municipalities with at least one Celtic grave, historical political fragmentation and instability,
the share of a municipalities area that is located in ecclesiastical territories in 1556, pre-medieval forest
areas, the share of Protestants in 1961 and a dummy for municipalities which belonged to the Duchy of
Wu¨rttemberg in 1789.
28
EQUAL PARTITION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
We compare these results to simple OLS estimates including all municipalities for which data ex-
ists, as shown in Table 4. The upper panel presents the results using distance to the border as
forcing variable, and the lower panel reports the results with geographic coordinates as forcing
variable. The ﬁrst column of the upper panel reports the coefﬁcient of a standard 2SLS regression
without a forcing variable and using all municipalities for which we have data. Column (2) shows
BDD estimates without controls and column (3) with controls. In the ﬁrst three columns, the over-
all share of part-time farmers in all farmers of a municipality in 1972 is the dependent variable, in
column (4) we additionally inspect the share of the category of ‘mainly part-time farmers’.
In all the estimations, the share of part-time (or mainly part-time) farms is statistically signiﬁcantly
higher than in the equal partition area. Most conservatively, the results imply a share that is on
average around 12 % (column 1). This provides robust empirical support for our argument linking
equal partition to the putting-out system, and part-time farming.
2.5 Consequences of Equal Partition for Industrialization and Structural Change
In the next step, we investigate the effects of equal partition on industrialization and structural
change. First, we focus on its impact on measures of industrialization and urbanization, i.e. popu-
lation density and (non-agricultural) ﬁrms per hectare. We estimate the same BDD speciﬁcation as
in Table 4. We also consider a smaller, ﬁve kilometers buffer area and look only at municipalities
immediately to the east and west of the border. Table 5 shows the results of those BDD estima-
tions. Columns (1) to (4) report the results for the natural logarithm of population density and
columns (5) to (8) those for ln ﬁrms per hectare. All results indicate that the equal partition area is
both economically and statistically signiﬁcantly more industrialized than the primogeniture area.
The most conservative estimations, where we consider the border municipalities and include all
controls (columns (4)), suggest that on average the population density of an equal partition munic-
ipality is around 84 % higher than that of a primogeniture municipality. Reassuringly, the results
do not depend on whether one uses a distance or a coordinates polynomial, underlining their
robustness to a more precise modeling of geographic location.
In Table 6, we analyze the effect of equal partition on structural change and industry structure.
We estimate the same BDD regressions as in the last table but now the dependent variables are
the share of employees in industry and agriculture. We ﬁnd equal partition positively and sig-
niﬁcantly related to structural change, as the share of workers in industry is at 10 to 20 % higher
in equal partition municipalities. The coefﬁcients are almost unchanged by different bandwidth
choice, inclusion of control variables or different polynomials, again showing a robust effect of
equal partition on the structure of the economy.
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Another prediction of our model is that primogeniture leads to sizable out-migration of non-
inheriting children from the rural primogeniture area into the more urbanized equal partition area.
To assess whether this is true we estimate a BDD with the municipal migration balance per capita
in 1950 as dependent variable (Table 7). We ﬁnd our expectations conﬁrmed as the per capita mi-
gration balance of equal split municipalities is on average signiﬁcantly more positive (by around 1
to 2%) than those of municipalities applying another inheritance tradition. These 2 % are roughly
corresponding to an increase by one standard deviation of the per capita migration balance and
thus, this is a non-negligible effect. As with the migration balance per capita however, we can-
not say where the migrating people come from, this is only indirect, yet suggestive evidence for
migration from the primogeniture to the equal partition area.
Table 7: Equal Partition and Inter-regional Migration in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg in 1950
Dependent Variable Migration
Balance p.c. 1950
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Buffer Area 10km 10km 5km Border Munics
Panel A: Linear Distance Polynomial
Equal Partition 0.017** 0.01 0.02** 0.019**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.01)
F-Value of Excluded IV 54.47 53.75 35.41 18.83
R2 -0.011 0.11 0.052 0.138
Panel B: Linear Coordinates Polynomial
Equal Partition 0.012** 0.006 0.011** 0.016*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.01)
F-Value of Excluded IV 108.32 77.73 59.79 17.83
R2 0.021 0.12 0.104 0.164
Observations 842 839 569 261
Border Segment FEs    
Geographic Controls – –  
Historical Controls – –  
French OZ Dummy – –  
Distance to Urban Center – –  
Intersects Major Railway – –  
Intersects Minor Railway – –  
Notes. Standard errors are clustered on county (Landkreis) level are in parentheses. Coefﬁcient
is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of observation
is a municipality in 1953. All regressions include a constant not reported. R2 is the centered
R2 of the second stage. Geographic controls include mean elevation, terrain ruggedness and soil
suitability as well as the share of agricultural area used to grow wine and fruits in 1961, distance
to Rhine or Neckar. Historical controls encompass distance to the closest Imperial city as of 1556,
distance to next certain Roman road, a dummy variable for municipalities with at least one Celtic
grave, historical political fragmentation and instability, the share of a municipalities total area that
is located in ecclesiastical territories in 1556, pre-medieval forest areas, the share of Protestants in
1961 and a dummy for municipalities which belonged to the Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg in 1789.
2.6 Robustness Checks
Our results are robust to various standard sensitivity tests and empirical exercises. A standard
robustness check for spatial RDDs is a placebo border test. In such a test, one shifts the border a
certain amount to the north, east, west, or south and re-assigns treatment units accordingly to the
new, (placebo) treatment area. There should be no signiﬁcant effect at this ‘false’ border—as it is
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located entirely in either the treated or untreated area. In our case, we shift the border ten kilometer
to the west and to the east and re-run the spatial RDDs using the ten kilometer buffer. This ensures
that we only have observations in the equal partition or primogeniture area in the sample. We run
placebo tests with the outcome variables from Table 5, 6 and 7. We always include the full set of
control variables and cluster standard errors on county level. A fuzzy RDD likewe have conducted
before would not yield reliable estimates, as the new equal partition area dummy would be a bad
proxy for being an actual equal partition municipality. This is because almost none of them are
actually equal partition municipalities but primogeniture or transitional ones. Therefore, we can
conduct this placebo test only be estimating a sharp RDD using the equal partition area dummy
as treatment variable. This is however also an insightful robustness check.
We report the results of the sharp RDD using the actual equal partition area dummy as treatment
variable in Panel A of Table 8. We consider only border municipalities for the sharp RDD as
this is the most demanding speciﬁcation. Results show statistically and economically signiﬁcant
coefﬁcients that are nevertheless smaller than those got with the fuzzy-RDD. Given that a sharp
BDD could be seen as an intention-to-treat model, it should give us the lower bound of the actual
effect of equal partition. Panel B of that table shows results of shifting the border ten kilometer
westwards—all observations are actually in the equal partition area. Panel C shows a shift of the
border ten kilometer eastwards—all observations are actual in the primogeniture area and Panel
D the consequences of shifting the border ﬁve kilometers eastwards. Reassuringly, in both cases,
almost all coefﬁcients are very small and close to zero. There is one exception in columns (1) and
(2) of Panel C, when the border is shifted eastwards, we ﬁnd a marginally signiﬁcant coefﬁcient
for population and ﬁrm density. When we shift however the border ﬁve kilometer eastwards, we
again do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for any variable. Thus, we should consider this a false
positive. We can conclude from the placebo test that the baseline results seem not to be due to
statistical coincidence.
Table 9 presents the results of two further robustness checks. First, Panel A shows the result of
the ‘Donut BDD’. This means we leave out the municipalities immediately to the east and west
of the border when estimating the fuzzy BDD. This can be useful to account for selective sorting,
measurement error (wrongly assigned municipalities) and to account for the fact that along the
border, it could occur that someone had a farm in the equal partition area but some of the ﬁelds
were located in the nearby primogeniture area—introducing noise in our measure of inheritance
traditions. Because we lose a signiﬁcant amount of observations by leaving out the border mu-
nicipalities, we enlarge the buffer area for those regressions to twenty kilometer. All results but
those for the migration balance per capita remain intact and show statistically and economically
signiﬁcant effects.
In Panel B, we address the concern that Stuttgart has been part of the panel but its size could be
unrelated to the inheritance rule. This historical residential city, today one of the largest agglom-
erations in Europe, could drive the results in favor of the equal partition area it is part of. Our
results are robust to estimating the BDD just for the rural areas to the south and north of Stuttgart.
We exclude the border segment containing Stuttgart and the eastern part of it agglomeration (the
fourth in Figure 5).
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We also choose the ﬁve kilometer buffer area to ensure that the included municipalities are further
away from Stuttgart and its suburbs. The resulting coefﬁcients are highly statistically signiﬁcant
and of qualitatively the same size as the original ones. Hence, Stuttgart and its large agglomeration
and industry area are not behind our results.
In the Online Appendix, we show the results of four more robustness checks. In Table A.4, Panel A,
we present BDD estimates using 15 instead of ﬁve border segments and re-estimate the BDD from
the baseline applying the ten kilometer buffer area. This leaves on average only 33 municipalities
on each side of the border and within each segment as observations. We ﬁnd however quantita-
tively and qualitatively similar results to the baseline estimates. If anything results regarding the
migration balance per capita are stronger than in the baseline case and remain statistically signiﬁ-
cant. As the effect size remains large we attribute this to the low number of observations and the
the problem that maybe too less variation was left to estimate the coefﬁcient precisely enough. In
Panel B, we include dummy variables for each historical state a municipality was located in 1789
to the full set of baseline controls and re-estimate the BDD. We gain virtually identical results. In
Panel C, we control for coal access, as measured by the size of late carboniferous geological areas
in km2, weighted by their distance to the municipality in km. We also control for market poten-
tial in 1500 AD (based on the Bairoch dataset of historical city populations) which is calculated
according to the methodology of Crafts (2005).25 While market potential in 1500 AD is signiﬁcant
in two cases, coal access is never, and thus, the results are almost identical to those of the baseline
estimations.26
Table A.5 in the Online Appendix presents the results of two last checks. In Panel A, we again
use the 5km buffer and include a quadratic distance polynomial instead of a linear one in the
regression. Results are almost unchanged. Thus, the exact shape of the polynomial of the forcing
variable is not a decisive point for our results. Finally, in Panel B we include exclaves of the
respective other basic inheritance tradition in the regression sample. As before, results change
little with the exclaves included.
Our baseline results have proven to be robust to a battery of commonly applied and useful ro-
bustness checks. This raises our conﬁdence that the effects we have identiﬁed are actually repre-
senting the effect of equal partition on industrialization and structural change and not something
else.
We complement our results for 1950 with results for 1961. For 1961, we do not have a migration
balance in the ofﬁcial statistics but the other four outcomes from the baseline analysis (popula-
tion and ﬁrm density, employment shares of industry and agriculture) we have available. Conse-
quently, we present the result of BDD estimations using these four dependent variables measured
in 1961, using the ﬁve kilometer buffer and including all baseline controls. The results are avail-
able in Table A.6 in the Appendix. They are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to those
for 1950. Thus, a potential bias from the distortions of World War II does not affect our baseline
results for 1950.
25. For a comprehensive description of both variables, the reader is referred to the Data Appendix.
26. If we had included market potential in 1800 or 1900 results would be almost unaffected.
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A ﬁnal check is to test how robust our BDD results are if we assume that unobserved heterogene-
ity still exists. To put it different, we can ask us the following question: How large a remaining
selection on unobservables has to be to make our results insigniﬁcant. Altonji et al. (2015) have
suggested a method enabling to assess selection on unobservables relative to observables neces-
sary to explain away the results (assuming the actual effect is zero). Recently, Oster (2019) has
improved their method and provides a Stata command (psacalc) which calculates a single value
(called “delta”) reporting how large selection on unobservables has to be relative to selection on
observables to put results in doubt. We calculate this value for each of the sharp RDD speciﬁca-
tions in Panel A of Table 8.27 The values are 3.66 for Table 8, Panel A, column (1), 3.27 for column
(2), 2.94 for column (3), 1.6 for column (4) and 10.47 for column (5). These values suggest that re-
maining selection on unobservables has to be unrealistically larger than selection on observables
to make our results to become insigniﬁcant. This raises our conﬁdence that they hold even if there
is still unobserved heterogeneity left.
3. Results for ContemporaryMunicipalities andOutcomes in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
To further test our model, we have to show that the effects of inheritance tradition persist, even
if agriculture today is of minor economic importance as a sector. This is also worthwhile investi-
gating to rule out that idiosyncrasies of the 1950s and early 1960s, especially World War II and the
European Economic Miracle could drive our results. Furthermore, sectoral change from agricul-
ture to industry and services is almost completed nowadays.
We cannot however repeat the analysis of the last section for contemporary municipalities and
economic outcomes. At ﬁrst, we do not have information on actual prevalence of inheritance tra-
ditions today. Rink and Hilbig (2018) conducted qualitative interviews with present-day German
farmers and found that most of them still stick to the historical way of transferring their property
to the next generation. This suggests that the overall pattern is likely the same. Regarding the ex-
istence and increasing frequency of transitional and mixed forms during the early 20th this might
not be the case. Second, as noted before, the number of municipalities has considerably declined
after an administrative reform in the 1970s, so that today we only have around one third of the
municipalities of 1953. Considering those facts, we use a different approach for the contemporary
analysis. We just took the borders of equal partition and assign each of today’s municipalities to
either the equal partition or primogeniture area when over 90 % of their area was located in one
or the other area. We then run a standard sharp BDD using the equal partition area dummy as
treatment indicator and estimate the following equation when employing distance to the eastern
border as forcing variable:
Outcomes,m =α+ βEqualPartitionAreas,m + f(Dm) + γ
′Xs,m + δs + s,m (19)
As previously, an alternative speciﬁcation includes a linear polynomial in a municipality’s latitude
27. The psacalc command does not work with estimates from a 2SLS regression, which is why we cannot perform this
test on the fuzzy-RDD results. We have assumed, following the original approach of Altonji et al. (2015) that the maximum
R2 that could be achieved if all unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for is 1. The values are robust to relax this and
assume e.g., a maximum of 0.9. This would result in deltas even more in our favor as they would suggest that unobserved
heterogeneity has to be even lager relatively to observed to undo our effects. The deltas obtained from assuming 0.9
maximum R2 are available from the authors upon request.
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and longitude as forcing variables, which modiﬁes equation 19 to look like this (with f(xm, ym)
again being the coordinates polynomial):
Outcomes,m =α+ βEqualPartitionAreas,m + f(xm, ym) + γ
′Xs,m + δs + s,m (20)
Estimating a sharp BDD assumes that no changes in the basic form have occurred since the 19th
century although we know that such changes and transitions happened, but likely because of
endogenous reasons. In this sense, the sharp BDD captures the idea of an intention-to-treat model
and should provide us with a lower bound estimate of the effect as it assumes that municipalities
are still treated with equal partition that in fact have transitional forms for some time now—which
should have smaller or no effects.
We include the same control variables (included inXs,m) as in the previous analysis for the 1950s.28
We choose a larger maximum and minimum bandwidth of 25 and ﬁve kilometer for our analy-
sis, as the number of observations is lower today than it was in 1950. Unlike before, we do not
cluster the standard errors on county level. The number of counties is so low today that clus-
tering is not feasible anymore (in the case of ﬁve kilometer buffer area we would have just 18
clusters/counties).
As dependent variables, we use the share of industrial buildings in all buildings in a municipality
in 2010 and the natural logarithm of income per capita in 2006. We also consider the share of
industrial area in a municipality’s total area as of March 2019. Table 10 shows the results of the
sharp BDD. It is organized in the same way as the previous tables. For all three outcomes, we ﬁnd
a positive and statistically and economically signiﬁcant effect of being in the equal partition area.
Municipalities in the historical equal partition area have on average an income per capita around
4 % larger than those in the primogeniture area (columns (7)–(9)).
In euros, the smallest coefﬁcient implies that in the equal partition area income per capita in 2006
was around 598 euros higher on average—which is over one third of the overall difference in
per capita income between both regions.29 Given that the equal partition area has around 7.4
million inhabitants in 2006, this amounts to an extra of 4.4 billion of income in total. The share
of industry buildings (columns (1)–(3)) is around 0.04 percentage points larger which might seem
small, but is a sizable effect as the average municipality has a share of 1.2 % of industry buildings
(the maximum is 14.5%). The share of industrial area is on average 30 percentage points larger,
which also is a large effect.
To conclude our results, the historical equal partition area is better developed amore industrialized
than the primogeniture area to the day, even though the agricultural sector and its inheritance
traditions make up only a small share of the economy. Hence, the different inheritance traditions
have led to different, persistent development path of their application areas.
28. We do not include however, the share of Protestants in 1950 and the share of agricultural areas used to grow wine and
fruits.
29. Results of those regressions are not shown to save space. They are available upon request. The average difference in
per capita income between the equal partition and primogeniture area in 2006 is 1,590 euros.
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4. Additional Results
4.1 Results for Demographic Outcomes
Based on a case study of the primogeniture area of northeastern part Wu¨rttemberg, Krafft (1930)
concluded that the number of children in the primogeniture area was smaller. He supposes that
people found one son enough to guarantee the future of the family property, and avoided to com-
pensate the other children. Another argument brought forward by him is that the higher marriage
age in the primogeniture areas limited the number of children a couple could get and contributed
to the lower population growth in the primogeniture area. Other scholars argued that it could be
the other way round and equal partition lead to fewer children as parents want to restrict further
fragmentation of property (Habakkuk 1955). Geographically more broad analyses like Sering and
von Dietze (1930) however could not ﬁnd a clear relationship between inheritance traditions and
fertility numbers or marriage ages. Hence, there is no consensus on whether and how inheritance
traditions inﬂuence demographic outcomes like birth rates. In Table A.7 in the Appendix, we
report the results of BDD regressions for demographic outcomes (death and birth rates, age struc-
ture etc.). We do not see a large inﬂuence of equal partition on the age structure or birth and death
rates. Giving the ambiguous arguments about the inﬂuence of equal partition on these outcomes
this is not surprising.
4.2 Results for late 19th Century Wu¨rttemberg
We now show that we ﬁnd similar impacts of inheritance traditions on economic development
when using alternative, and historically earlier inheritance data from Krafft (1930)30, which is for
1895 but restricted to the area of Wu¨rttemberg. Industrialization in this area was ongoing at least
since 1850, but also as we know that the 20th century has seen the frequent emergence of transi-
tional and mixed inheritance practices. Looking at an earlier period when more municipalities still
applied the traditional basic inheritance practices primogeniture and equal partition should give a
clearer picture about their effects than the more complex picture in the mid-20th century. Further-
more, studying an earlier period based on a different source for the inheritance traditions, could
reassure us that our results are not depending on the particular survey of Ro¨hm (1957).
As dependent variables, we consider population density in 1834 and 1895, and the number of
industry ﬁrms and farms per hectare, all in 1895. Information necessary to calculate these variables
comes from the ofﬁcial statistics of the kingdom of Wu¨rttemberg from 1895 (Statistical Ofﬁce of
Wu¨rttemberg 1900). We use the same control variables as before, but we only consider the railway
network as of 1894 and the share of Protestants in 1895 (also from the ofﬁcial statistics). We do
not include the share of agricultural area in which wine or fruits are grown, as there is no data.
Distance to urban center we adjust to take into account that the kingdom of Wu¨rttemberg only
had two large urban centers, Stuttgart and Ulm.31
TheData Appendix (Table A.3) provides a descriptive overview of the dataset for 1895Wu¨rttemberg.
30. We thank Sebastian Braun for making available to us his shapeﬁle of municipalities in Wu¨rttemberg as of 1890, which
is the basis for our dataset. There were no changes in municipalities between 1890 and 1905.
31. We also include latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates of a municipality’s centroid as controls to account for general
spatial development patterns. This is important, as we are not able to include county ﬁxed effects into the regression.
Around 1900, Wu¨rttemberg had more than 60 counties (“Obera¨mter”) and, based on the Krafft (1930) map, there is not a
lot of variation in inheritance traditions within these comparatively small counties.
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As the map of Krafft (1930) does not include a border and given that it is unclear what the original
inheritance practice of his “mixed traditions” is, we are not able to draw one. OLS regressions
are therefore the only feasible choice. Table 11 reports the results of estimations with the equal
partition dummy as variable of interest and the four dependent variables, introduced above. The
estimated coefﬁcients suggest that, as in 1950 and today, municipalities applying equal partition
have signiﬁcantly lower farm sizes, higher population densities and are more industrialized. This
implies that our results from other periods are not coincidence or depend on Ro¨hm’s map.
Table 11: Equal Partition and Municipal Economic Development in the 19th Century Wu¨rttemberg
Dependent Variable ln(Farms per
hectare 1895)
ln(Population
Density 1834)
ln(Population
Density 1895)
ln(Firms per
hectare 1895)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Equal Partition 0.357*** 0.28*** 0.282*** 0.205**
(0.067) (0.078) (0.078) (0.084)
Geographic Controls    
Historical Controls    
Distance to Urban Center    
Intersects Major Railway  –  
Intersects Minor Railway  –  
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,316
R2 0.416 0.203 0.232 0.177
Notes. Standard errors are clustered on county (Oberamt) level are in parentheses. Coefﬁcient is statistically different from zero at the ***1
%, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a municipality in 1890. All regressions include a constant not reported. Geographic
controls include mean elevation, terrain ruggedness and soil suitability, as well as distance to Rhine or Neckar and latitude and longitude
of a municipality’s centroid. Historical controls encompass distance to the closest Imperial city as of 1556, distance to next certain Roman
road, a dummy variable for municipalities with at least one Celtic grave, historical political fragmentation and instability, the share of a
municipalities total area that is located in ecclesiastical territories in 1556, pre-medieval forest areas, the share of Protestants in 1895 and a
dummy for municipalities which belonged to the Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg in 1789.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the consequences of agricultural traditions on the degree of industrializa-
tion and structural change in the 20th and 21st century. We ﬁnd, in line with our theoretical propo-
sitions, equal partition is beneﬁcial from an economic point of view, as it led to smaller farms and
only children with an inheritance. This implies that part-time farmers, that allocated a portion
of their working time to non-agricultural activities, ﬁrst within the rural-putting out system, and
later in factories, were the nucleus of today’s decentralized industry in Southern Germany. Equal
partition areas saw a lower level of out-migration from rural areas to industrial centers, which
allowed a higher population growth in the Post-Malthusian Era, which fostered industrialization,
as shown with data from the 1950s and today.
Small-scale differences in agricultural inheritance traditions can explain thewell-known, and unique,
decentralized industrial structure of the area. They might also explain why its economic prosperity
and high level of innovation rests on small and medium-sized ﬁrms instead of large, multinational
companies. Our results support the view outlined by German historians that, unlike for example
in England, the (comparatively late) industrialization of Germany was a rural phenomenon. It did
not start in places that are large cities today, but in remote areas and with small ﬁrms and part-
time farmers become craftsmen, textile, or tobacco workers. This ﬁnding can shed light on the
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development of domestic demand and industrialization processes in other world regions.
On a more general level, the paper is among the ﬁrst to study the long-run development of rural
areas. Historically, most people lived in rural areas outside the large cities. Shedding light on the
developments in these, more remote areas is instrumental for a full understanding of the causes
and diffusion of industrialization throughout Europe in the 19th and early 20th century. We hope
that this study will inspire others to have a closer look at the historical developments in rural
areas.
This paper proposes a channel through which agricultural inheritance norms affected the pattern
of economic development. It is a natural follow-up question to derive counterfactuals on how
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg would have developed if there was historically only one inheritance norm. If
equal partition had for example never existed, this would have increased migration to cities. How
much larger would Stuttgart be today? Would Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, or Germany, be richer now?
All these questions call for more theory, and yet more data.
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Appendix (For online publication only)
A.1. The Map of Inheritance practices of Ro¨hm (1957)
Figure A.1: Map of Inheritance Practices and Partitioned Common Land in 1953 according to Ro¨hm
(1957).
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A.2. Data Set and Variables Description
Table A.1: Descriptive Overview of the Data Set for Municipalities as of 1953
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Birth p.c. 1950 3,372 0.019 0.006 0.002 0.175
Celtic Grave 3,382 0.428 0.991 0.000 13.000
Coal Potential 3,382 209.954 5.895 199.727 227.442
Commons 3,382 0.267 0.442 0.000 1.000
Distance to Eastern Border 3,382 -2.263 41.643 -100.476 85.063
Distance to Imperial City 1556 3,382 11.331 9.843 0.000 51.745
Distance to Neolithic Settlement Area 3,382 6.099 6.613 0.000 33.730
Distance to Rhine or Neckar 3,380 23.572 20.471 0.000 88.011
Distance to Roman Road 3,382 9.713 9.573 0.000 48.148
Elevation (mean) 3,380 474.774 200.677 96.333 1216.923
Employment Share Agriculture 1950 3,378 0.338 0.139 0.011 0.817
Employment Share Industry 1950 3,378 0.389 0.19 0.007 0.893
Equal Partition Area 3,382 0.488 0.500 0.000 1.000
Equal Partition Transition 3,382 0.153 0.360 0.000 1.000
Exclave Equal Partition 3,382 0.012 0.107 0.000 1.000
Exclave Primogeniture 3,382 0.012 0.111 0.000 1.000
Farms per acre 3,379 13.988 10.027 0.000 259.130
French Occupation Zone 3,382 0.565 0.496 0.000 1.000
Historical Political Fragmentation 3,379 20075.080 27898.930 71.574 118850.000
Historical Political Instability 3,382 3.724 1.438 0.000 10.000
Intersects Major Railway 3,382 0.17 0.376 0 1
Intersects Minor Railway 3,382 0.304 0.46 0 1
Latitude 3,382 5376216.000 62732.270 5267568.000 5513552.000
Latitude*Longitude 3,382 2690000000000.000 287000000000.000 2060000000000.000 3280000000000.000
ln(Firms per acre 1950) 3,373 1.542 0.901 -2.596 6.360
ln(Population 1939) 3,378 6.527 0.973 3.258 13.115
ln(Population Density 1950) 3,378 4.631 0.782 1.861 8.608
ln(Population Density 1961) 3,381 4.675 0.892 1.485 8.611
Longitude 3,382 500216.700 51094.990 389401.900 606720.000
Marriages p.c. 1950 3,347 0.010 0.003 0.000 0.112
Market Potential in 1500 3,382 13.016 0.412 12.431 18.337
Migration Balance p.c. 1950 3,263 0.002 0.027 -0.132 0.353
Min. Distance to Urban Center 3,382 41.497 26.546 0.000 125.878
Mixed Inheritance 3,382 0.039 0.193 0.000 1.000
Primogeniture Transition 3,382 0.121 0.326 0.000 1.000
Share <6 Years old 3,375 0.090 0.024 0.006 0.845
Share >65 Years 3,376 0.101 0.051 0.007 1.168
Share 15–20 3,376 0.085 0.034 0.009 0.734
Share 20–45 2,297 0.341 0.083 0.031 3.946
Share 45-65 2,297 0.223 0.032 0.022 0.649
Share 5–15 3,376 0.169 0.038 0.014 1.486
Share Ecclesiastical Territory 1556 3,382 0.124 0.3 0.000 1.000
Share mainly part-time Farmers 1972 1,164 0.553 0.220 0.000 1.000
Share Big Farms 3,375 0.378 0.257 -0.006 1.909
Share Helping Family Members 3,380 0.144 0.081 0.003 0.463
Share part-time Farmers (total) 1972 1,145 0.686 0.181 0.121 1.000
Share Pre-Medieval Forest Area 3,382 0.234 0.4 0 1
Share Protestants 1950 3,378 0.437 0.538 0.000 23.056
Share Wine and Fruits 1961 3,381 1.765 4.078 0.000 36.500
Soil Suitability (Mean) 3,380 22.258 8.282 0.000 52.000
Terrain Ruggedness (mean) 3,380 100.496 71.543 2.366 460.234
Wu¨rttemberg in 1789 3,382 0.231 0.421 0.000 1.000
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Table A.2: Descriptive Overview of the Data Set for Contemporary Municipalities
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Celtic Grave 1,105 0.405 0.491 0.000 1.000
Coal Potential 3,382 209.954 5.895 199.727 227.442
Distance to Eastern Border 1,105 -2.649 40.358 -96.783 83.086
Distance to Imperial City 1556 1,105 9.467 8.994 0.000 47.45
Distance to Neolithic Settlement Area 1,105 4.843 6.282 0.000 31.236
Distance to Rhine or Neckar 1,105 12.916 12.992 0.000 64.653
Distance to Roman Road 1,105 7.865 8.446 0.000 40.900
Elevation (mean) 1,101 469.448 204.369 95.824 1150.703
Equal Partition Area 1,105 0.514 0.500 0.000 1.000
Exclave Equal Partition 1,105 0.018 0.133 0.000 1.000
Exclave Primogeniture 1,105 0.018 0.133 0.000 1.000
French Occupation Zone 1,105 0.5312217 0.4992502 0 1
Historical Political Fragmentation 1,105 18735.050 24752.880 108.754 99351.710
Historical Political Instability 1,105 4.474 1.937 1.000 13.000
ln(Income per capita 2006) 1,101 2.64 0.145 2.005 3.564
Market Potential in 1500 3,382 11.72 0.307 11.412 14.332
Min. Distance to Urban Center 1,105 35.920 27.763 0.000 122.201
Share Ecclesiastical Territory 1556 1,105 0.128 0.28 0.000 1.000
Share Industrial Area 2019 1,105 0.690 1.043 0.000 11.005
Share Industry Buildings 2010 1,105 0.013 0.014 0.000 0.145
Share Pre-Medieval Forest Area 1,105 0.24 0.388 0 1
Soil Suitability (mean) 1,105 58.572 15.890 0.000 84.667
Terrain Ruggedness (mean) 1,101 101.590 71.159 3.267 394.681
Latitude 1,105 5375100.000 59102.100 5267375.000 5510273.000
Longitude 1,105 500146.000 50903.090 392342.400 604822.000
Latitude*Longitude 1,105 2690000000000.000 283000000000.000 2070000000000.000 3270000000000.000
Wu¨rttemberg in 1789 1,105 0.246 0.431 0.000 1.000
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Table A.3: Descriptive Overview of the Data Set for 1895 Wu¨rttemberg Municipalities
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Celtic Grave 1,912 0.292 0.455 0.000 1.000
Distance to Imperial City 1556 1,912 7.392 6.791 0.000 32.553
Distance to Rhine or Neckar 1,912 17.924 16.456 0.000 72.528
Distance to Roman Road 1,912 7.140 8.712 0.000 48.456
Distance to Urban Center 1,912 45.137 22.230 0.004 106.217
Elevation (mean) 1,912 496.541 155.836 165.800 934.500
Equal Partition 1,912 0.395 0.489 0.000 1.000
Historical Political Fragmentation 1,909 14510.030 22129.960 74.152 105329.100
Historical Political Instability 1,912 3.602 1.418 0.000 8.000
Intersects Major Railway 1,912 0.154 0.361 0.000 1.000
Intersects Minor Railway 1,912 0.144 0.352 0.000 1.000
Latitude 1,912 48.625 0.427 47.599 49.580
ln(Farms per Acre 1895) 1,910 -1.906 0.663 -4.808 1.920
ln(Firms per acre 1895) 1,363 -2.721 0.790 -5.352 1.553
ln(Population Density 1834) 1,909 -0.307 0.898 -3.520 3.496
ln(Population Density 1895) 1,909 -0.193 0.927 -3.219 3.981
Longitude 1,912 9.403 0.494 8.304 10.454
Share Ecclesiastical Territory 1556 1,912 0.083 0.247 0.000 1.000
Share Pre-Medieval Forest Area 1,912 0.164 0.347 0.000 1.000
Share Protestants 1,832 0.649 0.442 0.001 1
Soil Suitability 1,912 63.301 12.892 0.000 85.000
Terrain Ruggedness (mean) 1,912 74.901 43.597 7.652 299.750
Wu¨rttemberg 1789 1,912 0.434 0.496 0.000 1.000
iv
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A.2.1. Deﬁnitions and Sources of the Variables
The spatial datasets were each converted into ETRS89 UTM 32N projection. GIS computa-
tions were performed with the QGIS software. Variables from the ofﬁcial statistics of Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg are explained in detail in the main text and are not included in the list below.
Celtic Grave. Dummy variable equal to one if in a municipality archaeologists have found
at least one Celtic grave. Variable calculated using a digitized version of the following map
from Kommission fu¨r geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (1988): https://www.
leo-bw.de/media/kgl_atlas/current/delivered/bilder/HABW_03_02.jpg (accessed latest on
27th March 2019).
Coal Potential. A municipality’s access to coal is measured as the as the size of the late carbonif-
erous geological areas around it in km2, weighted by their distance to the municipality in km.
Data on the size and location of carboniferous geological areas is taken from Asch2005.
Distance to Imperial City 1556. Distance to city states is calculated as follows: Points with random
location were generated until 1,000 points fell in into each municipality. In a second step, the
Euclidean distance from each of the 1,000 points per municipality to the closest Imperial city
was calculated. In a last step, these distances were aggregated by municipality. The location
of city states follows the maps of territories of the HRE in 1556 by Wolff (1877) but we have
corrected/ supplemented them—if necessary—with information from Ko¨bler (1988), Keyser and
Stoob (1939–1974) and Jacob (2010).
Distance to Neolithic Settlement Area. Distance to Neolithic settlement area is calculated as fol-
lows: Points with random location were generated until 1,000 points fell in into each munic-
ipality. In a second step, the Euclidean distance from each of the 1,000 points per munici-
pality to the closest segment of the Neolithic settlement area polygons was calculated. In a
last step, these distances were aggregated by municipality. Variable calculated using a digi-
tized version of the following map from Kommission fu¨r geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg (1988): https://www.leo-bw.de/media/kgl_atlas/current/delivered/bilder/
HABW_03_01.jpg (accessed latest on 27th March 2019).
Distance to Rhine and Neckar. Distance to those rivers is calculated as follows: Points with random
location were generated until 1,000 points fell in into each municipality. In a second step, the
Euclidean distance from each of the 1,000 points per municipality to the closest of both rivers
was calculated. In a last step, these distances were aggregated by municipality. For the location
of the rivers, we used the dataset for ’WISE large rivers’ shapeﬁle, which can be downloaded here:
https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/wise-large-rivers-and-large-lakes(last
accessed May, 30th 2016).
Distance to Roman Roads. Distance to (minor and major) Roman roads is calculated as follows:
Points with random location were generated until 1,000 points fell in into each municipality.
In a second step, the Euclidean distance from each of the 1,000 points per municipality to the
to the closest Roman road was calculated. These distances were aggregated by municipality.
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Locations of Roman roads (minor and major) originate from a shapeﬁle included in the “Digital
Atlas of Roman and Medieval Civilizations” (McCormick et al. 2013). The shapeﬁle is based on
the map of Roman roads in the Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World (Talbert 2000).
It can be downloaded here: http://darmc.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k40248&pageid=
icb.page601659 (last accessed September, 24th 2015).
Elevation (mean). Mean elevation of each municipality in meters. Data is based on the Digital
Elevation Model (DEM) of the U.S. Geological Survey’s Center for Earth Resources Observation
and Science (EROS), namely the GTOPO30 dataset, which can be downloaded here https://
lta.cr.usgs.gov/GTOPO30 (last accessed May, 30th 2016). The GTOPO30 has a spatial resolution
of 30 arc seconds.
French Occupation Zone. Dummy variable equal to one if the majority of a municipality was
located within the French Occupation Zone. Assignment of municipalities to the French Occu-
pation Zone is based on the shapeﬁle of the French Occupation zone provided by Schumann
(2014).
Historical Political Fragmentation. Historical average state size of the states intersecting the munic-
ipality in km2. Variable is calculated using digitized versions of the maps of the HRE printed in
Wolff (1877).
Historical Political Instability. The variable reports the number of different historical states inter-
secting a municipality. Variable is calculated using digitized versions of the maps of the HRE
printed in Wolff (1877).
Intersects Major Railway. Dummy Variable if a major railway line (“Haupteisenbahnlinie”) inter-
sects the area of a municipality. The Variable is based on a digitized version of the following map
from Kommission fu¨r geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (1988): https://www.
leo-bw.de/media/kgl_atlas/current/delivered/bilder/HABW_10_04.jpg (accessed latest on
27th March 2019). The map shows the railway network after its last wave of expansion in
1934.
Intersects Minor Railway. Dummy Variable if a minor railway line (“Regionale Eisenbahnlinie”or
“Nebeneinsenbahnlinie”) intersects the area of a municipality Variable is based on a digitized ver-
sion of the following map from Kommission fu¨r geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
(1988): https://www.leo-bw.de/media/kgl_atlas/current/delivered/bilder/HABW_10_04.jpg
(accessed latest on 27th March 2019). The map shows the railway network after its last wave of
expansion in 1934.
Market Potential in 1500. A municipality’s market potential is calculated following the methodol-
ogy of Crafts (2005). Unlike Crafts measure of regional economic potential, our measure is not
based on the GDP of all other municipalities, but on the population size of the historical cities
included in the database of Bairoch, Batou, and Chevre (1988).
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Minimum Distance to Urban Center. Distance to the closest of these urban centers, namely Freiburg,
Heidelberg, Mannheim, Karlsruhe or Stuttgart is calculated as follows: Points with random lo-
cation were generated until 1,000 points fell in into each municipality. In a second step, the Eu-
clidean distance from each of the 1,000 points per municipality to the closest of those cities was
calculated. In a last step, these distances were aggregated by municipality. Location of the cities
is determined by the minimum latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates of the city and based on
the shapeﬁle of municipalities resulting from digitization of the map of Ro¨hm (1957).
Latitude. Minimum longitudinal coordinates a municipality’s centroid (mid-point) in meters.
Longitude. Minimum longitudinal coordinates of a municipality’s centroid (mid-point) in me-
ters.
Share Ecclesiastical Territory 1556. Variable is the share of a municipality’s area that was located
in an ecclesiastical state in 1556. The map of territories within the current state of Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg originates from Huning and Wahl (2019).
Share Industrial Area 2019. Variable that indicates the share of a municipalities area that is used
for industrial purposes. This variable is generated by extracting industry area polygons from
OpenStreetMap data using the respective tool in QGIS. Data represents the situation as of 10th
March 2019.
Share Industry Buildings 2010. Represents the share of industry buildings (factories etc.) of all
buildings in a municipality as of 2010. Variable originates from the data set of Asatryan, Havlik,
and Streif (2017).
Share Pre-Medieval Forest Area. The share of each municipality’s area that is located in pre-
medieval forest area. Variable is calculated based on a digitized version of a map by Ellenberg
(1990).
Soil Suitability. Soil Suitability is based on the agricultural suitability measure developed in Zabel,
Putzenlechner, and Mauser (2014).1 The measure used in the paper is average agricultural suit-
ability in the period 1961–1990. Zabel, Putzenlechner, and Mauser (2014) measure agricultural
suitability by considering climate (temperature, precipitation, solar radiation), soil (pH, texture,
salinity, organic carbon content, etc.), and topography (elevation and slope) of a grid cell of 30
arc seconds*30 arc seconds (0.86 km2 at the equator) size. They consider rain-fed conditions as
well as irrigation (what could, among other things, give rise to endoeneity issues). To compute
agricultural suitability, they contrast these factors with growing requirements of 16 plants (Bar-
ley, Cassava, Groundnut, Maize, Millet, Oilpalm, Potato, Rapeseed, Rice, Rye, Sorghum, Soy,
Sugarcane, Sunﬂower, Summer wheat, Winter wheat).
Terrain Ruggedness (Mean). Following Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot (1999) average ruggedness of
1. The data set is described further here: http://geoportal-glues.ufz.de/stories/globalsuitability.html (last
accessed on January 22, 2016), where it also can be downloaded.
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a municipality’s territory is calculated as the negative value of the derivative of the ruggedness
index of a digital elevation model. The calculations are based on the elevation raster of Nunn
and Puga (2012) (see above).
Wu¨rttemberg 1789. Dummy Variable equal to one if the majority of a municipality was located in
the Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg in 1789. Assignment of municipalities to the historical duchy is based
on the map of territories in 1789 from Huning and Wahl (2019).
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Table A.7: Equal Partition, Industrialisation and Economic Structure in 1961
Dependent Variable ln(Population
Density 1961)
ln(Firms per Acre
1961)
Employment Share
Industry 1961
Employment Share
Agrar 1961
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Buffer Area 10km
Equal Partition 0.908*** 0.729*** 0.120** -0.135**
(0.309) (0.257) (0.049) (0.065)
Border Segment FEs    
Geographic Controls    
Historical Controls    
French OZ Dummy    
Distance to Urban Center    
Intersects Major Railway    
Intersects Minor Railway    
Observations 586 586 586 586
F-value of Excluded IV 34.34 34.34 34.34 34.34
R2 0.465 0.386 0.394 0.386
Notes. Standard errors are clustered on county (Landkreis) level are in parentheses. Coefﬁcient is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5
% and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a municipality in 1953. All regressions include a constant not reported. R2 is the centered R2 of the
second stage. Geographic controls include mean elevation, terrain ruggedness and soil suitability as well as the share of agricultural area used to
grow wine and fruits in 1961, distance to Rhine or Neckar. Historical controls encompass distance to the closest Imperial city as of 1556, distance
to next certain Roman road, a dummy variable for municipalities with at least one Celtic grave, historical political fragmentation and instability, the
share of a municipalities total area that is located in ecclesiastical territories in 1556, pre-medieval forest areas, the share of Protestants in 1961 and a
dummy for municipalities which belonged to the Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg in 1789.
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